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The papers presented at the conference held last June, 
together with the policy statement of the National Council 
on Employment Policy, serve to highlight the importance of 
labor force and productivity data systems as a resource for 
policy formulation. They also address the concerns of many 
about the adequacy and viability of these systems.
According to the Council, the federal government in fiscal 
1983 will be spending 20 percent less than it did in 1980 for 
labor force and economic data, forcing a decline in the qual 
ity and quantity of many data series and curtailment of need 
ed research and development. While it seems obvious that 
the relative costs and benefits of data systems must be 
analyzed in an era of budget constriction, it seems equally 
obvious that data systems which accurately capture the net 
social impacts of domestic policy are of vital importance to 
both policymakers and the general public.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole 
responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent the positions of the W. E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research.
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What has been happening to the United States' labor force 
and productivity data systems? That was the major question 
examined at a conference sponsored by the National Council 
on Employment Policy held in Washington on June 17, 
1982. The Council, a private nonprofit organization with 
special interest and expertise in the areas of labor market and 
employment and training programs, set out to examine 
whether the basic concepts and definitions used in collecting 
and reporting labor force and productivity data portray cur 
rent conditions and whether the available data are adequate 
for policy formulation and evaluation processes.
Joining Council members at this conference were leading 
public and private economic and statistical analysts. The 
debate during the conference over these issues and the 
material presented in the four main Council-sponsored 
papers was enlightening and informative, but often also 
heated.
American social and economic policies in the early 1980s 
have experienced significant changes. The conference ex 
plored how existing statistics have been, and can be, used by 
policymakers in reaching key decisions. But beyond the 
quality and quantity of existing data, the conferees examined 
critically the strengths and weaknesses in the American labor 
force data system.
2 Introduction
This volume contains the papers presented at the con 
ference. As published, the papers reflect the comments and 
critiques presented during the course of the deliberations. 
Based on the proceedings, the Council prepared a brief 
policy statement, *'Labor Force and Productivity 
Measurements: Danger Ahead." The Council concluded 
that the United States' labor force and productivity data 
systems face deterioration because of a "starvation budget" 
which has forced a decline in the quality and quantity of the 
published information and a curtailment of needed research.
While each paper examined one part of the system, the 
Council's statement tries to view the system as a whole. It 
places American labor force and productivity data 
measurements in the context of recent federal budgeting 
developments. It took many years to create the system, the 
Council cautioned, and it could lose the trust of 
policymakers and the general public if it is allowed to 
deteriorate.
No econometric model or policy evaluation can be better 
than the data on which it is founded. Ideology and basic 
values will always play a significant part in this process. 
However, sound data can provide a tether that links 
policymakers, the media, and the general public with reality. 
It is the Council's hope to strengthen this tether and to point 






A policy statement by 
The National Council on Employment Policy*
Growing Concern
The United States' labor force and productivity data 
system faces a serious problem of deterioration at a time 
when the American economy is experiencing radical 
transformations. Changing public policies, combined with 
slumping productivity and other technological and social 
forces, are buffeting our society. Compounding the domestic 
factors is a growing internationalization in the flows of 
capital, commodities and labor, making the United States in 
creasingly cognizant of foreign economic conditions.
Given these changes and more recent shifts in social pro 
grams, federal spending, taxes, monetary policy and interna 
tional markets, measures are necessary to assess the impact 
of these transformations. Who in our society has been
*The National Council on Employment Policy is a private nonprofit organization of 
academicians and policy experts with a special interest in the areas of labor market and 
employment and training programs. This policy statement represents the combined judg 
ment of the Council members. Despite divergence of opinion on details, the members 
unanimously agreed to this statement.
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helped by the new economic policies, and who is experienc 
ing more economic hardship? What tools are available to 
track the resulting changes? What sectors have experienced 
gains in productivity, and what factors have caused these in 
creases? Our public policies and private investment decisions 
depend upon these data as billions of dollars literally are 
riding on the monthly labor force estimates published by the 
U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). An annual rise of 1 percent in unemployment can 
unleash various forces that can increase the federal deficit by 
some $25 billion, affecting not only millions of lives but also 
domestic and foreign financial markets which in turn feed 
back on labor market results. Also, estimates of local 
unemployment, income and related data determine the size 
of allocations for many federal programs.
The thermometer of labor force and productivity 
measurements has taken on an added importance. While 
politicians cannot rely solely upon statistics, it would be 
foolhardy to try to fashion economic policies without con 
sidering their impact on the workforce and households as 
summarized in our labor force data system. It is no wonder 
that President Reagan has displayed an interest not only in 
overall labor force data but even in the seasonal adjustment 
of labor force estimates one of the most arcane aspects of 
these data.
At a time when we need reliable labor force and produc 
tivity data, clear danger signals have emerged. First, some 
basic concepts have not been updated since the 1930s despite 
vast social and economic changes. Second, while our data 
system may not be exempt from budget reductions, there are 
some cost cutting moves that may save money in the short 
run only to wind up costing the nation more in the long run. 
Our labor force and productivity estimates should be able to 
play a major role in public policy formulation and in helping
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to evaluate the results of these efforts by providing feedback 
to alert policymakers concerned with possible mid-course 
corrections.
In general, there is much to be proud of in our workforce 
data system. However, there are indications that inertia may 
be setting in despite the best efforts of many competent and 
dedicated government experts. Yet, the data system can be 
expanded and kept up to date with minimal costs to help 
shed light on the formulation and evaluation of economic 
policies. Our data system will deteriorate if we cannot 
redesign and modernize it. Depreciation is a factor in this 
social investment, just as in our system of public works and 
private capital.
All this indicates serious potential problems. It should be 
remembered that no law forces households or employers to 
participate in the government surveys which generate these 
data. Without full public support and trust, the system 
would fall apart very rapidly. However, policymakers, the 
media and many citizens have increasingly questioned this 
data system. It would be wise to consider these rumblings, 
for they indicate serious potential problems.
The good news is that the American labor force data 
system and productivity estimates remain free from partisan 
political influences. On a methodological level the system re 
mains one of the world's best and in many ways number 
one in terms of statistical sampling techniques and the 
utilization of computer technology and analysis. This data 
system still represents a standard of excellence that most 
other nations strive to emulate.
The bad news is that the system has been far slower in 
adopting basic concepts and definitions to reflect current 
economic conditions and workforce behavior. This lag has 
reduced the system's usefulness in the policy process.
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Economic Hardship
Our current labor force data system often falls short of 
providing the necessary information for policy formulation. 
It is not just a question of whether or not the unemployment 
rate should be jiggled up or down. The real problem centers 
in on the basic concepts of what we should measure.
One of the major areas in which the American data system 
has experienced the most inertia concerns the concept of 
economic hardship. Basing public policy on indices measur 
ing the number of people employed and those not employed 
but looking for jobs might have been adequate in the 1930s, 
but it does not provide the data needed in the 1980s. Given 
the massive size of the government's income support system, 
the conditions of the working poor, and vast changes in the 
composition of the labor force, we should move beyond the 
assumption, contained in our current statistics, that people 
are either employed or forced into idleness.
In the pre-New Deal days when few needy individuals 
received income support and people either worked or starv 
ed, these concepts reflected reality. But, for better or worse, 
we do not live in such a society. What is required for mean 
ingful analysis and public policy direction are new social in 
dicators that would not only measure employment, but 
would link earnings and income data with labor force status, 
time worked and household living conditions. Such indices 
would tell us the number of persons who are unable to attain 
a socially acceptable standard of living through work.
When the government started its monthly effort to 
measure unemployment toward the end of the Great Depres 
sion, economic hardship was more directly correlated with 
unemployment. Under the conditions of the 1930s, any 
job no matter what the rate of pay or hours of work was 
considered better than no job. Hence, the length of the ranks
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of the unemployed was an acceptable proxy measure for 
deprivation.
The American economy has undergone major institutional 
change since the 1930s, and yet the concepts and definitions 
used in forming the unemployment statistics have hardly 
changed at all. The American economy now includes a vast 
transfer payment system carrying an annual price tag in ex 
cess of $380 billion or one out of every six dollars of 
disposable personal income. Public transfer payments have 
an impact on all segments of society, and in fact the vast ma 
jority goes to the middle class and affluent. Our concepts 
about labor force behavior reflect conditions of the Great 
Depression and are not necessarily applicable to today's 
labor markets. For example, an individual may be 
unemployed and yet receive income support, or be part of a 
household with income that may indicate affluence.
However, there is another side to the coin. For millions of 
Americans, employment even a full-time job does not of 
fer escape from poverty. An individual may be employed 
and still live in poverty as defined by the federal government. 
A statistical system that reports labor force participation 
monthly but pays only scant attention to income and 
underemployment is bound to fail as an indicator of real 
conditions. We are bound to draw disastrously wrong con 
clusions when we use such a statistic as a foundation for 
governmental policies.
It is ironic that meteorologists have recognized a similar 
problem in their field, and they have devised solutions which 
the public uses every day. For example, what makes us un 
comfortable during a winter day? The meteorologists' con 
cept of the "wind-chill" factor combines temperature with 
wind data to produce a realistic and understandable measure 
of actual outdoor conditions. The older measure, 
temperature, simply does not convey enough information
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about windy, chilly days. On summer days, the 
termperature-humidity index combines the factors that make 
us uncomfortable. By itself temperature might not make us 
uncomfortable, and it must be placed in context with other 
factors.
A similar concept should be applied to employment, earn 
ings, and household data to provide a realistic measure of 
labor market-related economic hardship. The impact of 
government policies and the extent to which economic 
hardship has been increased or reduced cannot be deter 
mined until we forge new statistical concepts for labor force 
measurements. Consider two individuals: person "A" works 
full-time, full-year at minimum wage and is the only wage 
earner in the family. Person "B" has just been laid off, but 
is part of a two-person household with the other member 
earning $25,000 a year. Common sense would indicate that 
"A" should be considered in the economic hardship ranks 
while "B" would not be facing deprivation. And yet under 
our current concepts "B" is counted as unemployed and 
therefore presumably in hardship while "A" would not be 
included in our leading measure of labor market pathologies. 
The unemployment statistics provide a shaky foundation for 
deciding national policy, and they are even of less value in 
deciding the allocation of federal funds among states and 
local areas.
Congress has recognized these problems on several occa 
sions and has mandated BLS to come up with labor market- 
related hardship measures. 1 However, BLS has been very 
slow to comply, and its recent first report on the subject fell 
short in meeting the concerns expressed in the congressional 
mandate. 2 A reporting system that would link labor market
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status with earnings and income should attempt to measure 
at a minimum:
 Inadequate individual earnings: How many persons 
who participate in the workforce during the year are 
unable to earn at least the minimum wage equivalent for 
their total hours of work availability?
While individual data are important, it is necessary to 
place a person's earnings in the context of their 
household status and family economic need. For these 
reasons, a reporting system should also measure:
 Inadequate family earnings: How many workforce 
participants are in families whose total wages and 
salaries are below the poverty level?
 Inadequate family income: How many workforce 
participants have family incomes (i.e., earnings plus any 
transfer payments and certain in-kind aid) below the 
poverty level?
The answers to the above questions can be derived annual 
ly from existing labor force data at a minimal cost. The 
resulting reporting system can provide important insights in 
to labor force operations, 3 including:
 One of every four workforce participants failed to earn 
the equivalent of the minimum wage for the hours the person 
was available for work during 1979. This count of inade 
quate individual earnings was nearly 5 times the average 
monthly unemployment level and 1.5 times the number who 
experienced any unemployment during the entire year.
 One of every nine workers lived in families with below- 
poverty earnings. The number of workers with inadequate 
family earnings was more than double the average annual 
unemployed and almost three-quarters the number who ex 
perienced any unemployment during the entire year.
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 6 percent of the workforce remained in poor families 
after receiving income transfers and other earnings sup 
plements.
 Only half of those who experienced joblessness during 
1979 had annual earnings below the minimum wage 
equivalent for the hours they were available for work. Less 
than one in four resided in families with below-poverty earn 
ings. Only one in seven remained in poverty after receipt of 
transfer and other earnings supplements.
 Low hourly earnings and limited hours of employment, 
rather than joblessness, were the major causes of economic 
hardship. Four of every ten poor persons above age 15 work 
ed in 1980 including 2.7 million low-paid workers employed 
full-time year round who lived in families with below- 
poverty earnings.
These data illuminate many concerns expressed by labor 
market analysts regarding the meaning of labor market 
status and economic hardship in our society. These same 
measures also show that:
 The incidence of inadequate earnings and income is 
most prevalent among female workers, minorities, younger 
and older labor force participants, and those with limited 
education, workers in service jobs, and residents of 
nonmetropolitan areas and large central cities. As a general 
rule, the burdens of hardship are more maldistributed than 
the burdens of unemployment (Figure 1).
 Economic hardship is a continuing structural problem, 
rising and falling over the business cycle, but changing pro 
portionately less than unemployment. Between 1979 and 
1980, when average annual unemployment rose by a fourth, 
the number of individuals with earnings below the minimum 
wage equivalent rose by only a sixth and the number of 
workers in families with below-poverty earnings by a 
seventh.
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Figure 1. The Rate of Economic Hardship is Higher Than the Rate 
of Unemployment for Female and Minority 
Labor Force Participants (1980)
Average annual 
unemployment
SOURCE: Robert Taggart, Hardship: The Welfare Consequences of Labor Market Prob 
lems (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1982).
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 During the most recent complete business cycle, be 
tween 1974-1980, the poverty incidence among workforce 
participants increased because of the declining effectiveness 
of the cash transfer safety net.
 These data indicate that to significantly alleviate labor 
market-related hardship would require a combination of 
macroeconomic and targeted structural measures, combined 
with expanded income transfers for the working poor. 
Economic recovery alone will not solve the economic hard 
ship problem of labor force participants. Assuming a 9 per 
cent unemployment rate in 1982 and a 5 percent inflation 
rate, an estimated 17 million workforce participants are in 
families with earnings below the poverty level. But if the 
unemployment rate fell to 7 percent and the inflation rate to 
2.5 percent, the number of workers living in poverty 
households would drop by less than 2 million, and their 
families would still need nearly $45 billion in earnings or sup 
plements to escape poverty.
This briefly summarized system of measuring the labor 
market-related hardship is an indication of what can be done 
with available CPS data and minimal expenditures. For all 
of these reasons, we strongly recommend that our official 
labor force measurement system should include indices link 
ing employment with earnings and income along the lines 
suggested above. Policymakers need relevant data to form 
and evaluate public programs. The lack of such hardship 
estimates is a major weakness in the current system.
Productivity and Social Indicators
Another major area of concern focuses on American pro 
ductivity data. Given the recent problems with slow growth, 
inflation and unemployment, policymakers have become 
highly interested in productivity growth rates, and they have
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issued numerous proposals to boost the slumping American 
trends.
The traditional concept of productivity considers only 
output-per-workhour. In 1981 output-per-workhour, known 
as labor productivity, of the private business economy rose 
at only one percent compared with a threefold increase in 
labor productivity between 1948 and 1973. By the end of the 
1970s, not only were labor productivity growth rates slump 
ing, but at times they were even negative.
It is commonly assumed that the health of the economy 
cannot be restored, and real wage gains cannot be resumed, 
until productivity growth rates rise commensurately (Figure 
2). At the same time concern is expressed that the United 
States has lost some of its former competitive advantage over 
foreign nations due to the fact that their productivity growth 
rates have tended to be higher than America's. There also 
has been a major shift of the American workforce into the 
service sector of the economy, and it is much more difficult 
to measure productivity in this area than in manufacturing 
or agriculture. Even when measured, there is also serious 
concern that it may be much more difficult to raise the 
output-per-workhour in the service sector.
With so much interest expressed in productivity growth 
rates, the data used to measure productivity must face as 
close an examination as the concepts of linking employment 
with earnings and family income. Also in this field there 
have been major advances in the basic concepts of how pro 
ductivity should be measured. The more recent concepts 
center on total factor productivity rather than on only labor 
productivity. Yet these advances still have not been reflected 
in our official data system.
Output-per-workhour, based on establishment survey 
reports submitted voluntarily by some 165,000 employers,
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Figure 2. Average Annual Compensation Per Full Time 
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SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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does not fully take into consideration or show the influence 
of other factors such as capital. A different picture emerges 
by looking at total factor productivity which relates output 
to all associated inputs. 4 Suppose, for example, that the 
labor required to produce a bushel of wheat vastly declines. 
Instead of human labor power, the farming process might 
become highly energy-intensive (i.e., energy, such as oil, 
petroleum-based fertilizer, and machinery, is substituted for 
human labor power). Total factor productivity would not 
rise as much as output-per-workhour in this case. Given the 
recent hikes in energy prices, the substitution of energy for 
labor cannot be ignored.
Conventional productivity measures, which concentrate 
on labor, may be overstating productivity growth rates. In 
1981, total factor productivity rose only 0.4 percent, or 60 
percent less than the BLS output-per-workhour figure. 
Moreover, the establishment survey is designed so that it ob 
tains better productivity data within the goods producing 
sector of the economy rather than in the more rapidly grow 
ing service sector. In fact, productivity is much more dif 
ficult to estimate within the service sector because of the dif 
ficulty in measuring units of production.
There are many conceptual and data problems in forming 
total factor productivity estimates. For example, how is 
capital to be aggregated and measured? How should capital 
stock be depreciated so that net capital levels are used in 
forming these estimates? The BLS has undertaken research 
into these questions, and it does hope by 1983 to make 
estimates that move beyond only labor productivity.
Similar to the area of unemployment, productivity 
analysis all too often has been hampered by a "one number 
syndrome." Labor productivity, like the official unemploy 
ment rate, is presumed to illuminate developments it was 
never designed to handle. Labor productivity estimates
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measure the change in labor spent per unit of output over 
time, and this may be all that is required for some analysis. 
However, for certain investment and growth policy decisions 
capital, labor and energy substitutions cannot be ignored, 
and it is significant to look at a combined measure of all in 
put requirements per unit of output over time.
We support BLS efforts to publish productivity estimates 
that not only include output-per-workhour but indices that 
also report total factor productivity, capital productivity, 
and energy productivity.
We also recommend that efforts be expanded to revise the 
establishment survey so that it mil better capture productivi 
ty and other changes within the rapidly growing service sec 
tor.
There are many reasons which can explain the recent 
decline in American productivity growth rates, but one key 
factor centers in on the concept of externalities which often 
are only measured by our social indicators. For example, 
prior to environmental laws a firm may have produced a ton 
of metal per hour plus an unhealthy level of pollution. 
Capital investment to clean up the air may now result in the 
firm producing a ton of metal per hour plus a safer environ 
ment. However, conventional productivity estimates will not 
capture this change since they only look at private produc 
tivity levels and not at social productivity that includes exter 
nalities.
Social indicators are required to augment the formal 
economic data on the labor force. Public investment has 
played a significant role in developing these newer data 
sources. In general, this public investment in social in 
dicators has been sound, and should be continued.
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Longitudinal Data
The current population survey and the establishment 
survey the two main samples discussed so far are most 
often used to create cross-sectional data, which are like a 
snapshot taken at one point in time. Several pictures can be 
placed together for a time series, which shows changes over 
months and years. While this provides policymakers with 
more information, it has problems. The individuals in each 
time series observation are, most often, not the same people. 
For this type of information, longitudinal data which follow 
specific individuals over time can provide a wealth of 
knowledge. Longitudinal data can help in such policy related 
questions as:
 What happens to families when they go through a 
divorce? What happens to labor market activity and 
earnings? Are the children reduced to poverty?
 What are the benefits and costs of specific employ 
ment and training programs for different types of in 
dividuals? What seems to work best and for whom?
 What is the full impact of business cycle conditions 
on different types of households?
 What are the net impacts of workfare and welfare 
programs?
Some of the most important policy-related questions can 
best be answered by longitudinal data. Part of the reason 
most econometric models failed to predict the major influx 
of women into the workforce was because their estimates 
were based on cross-sectional data on such variables as a 
wife and husband's educational and earnings status. The 
cross-sectional picture proved to be misleading.
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The federal government has been the major sponsor of 
longitudinal data series. From the point of view of policy 
formulation and evaluation, longitudinal data collection and 
analysis are highly productive investments of research 
dollars. There has been some concern expressed by leading 
labor force analysts that, in an effort to cut domestic spend 
ing, these efforts will be vastly reduced. 5 It would be a 
serious mistake to trim investment in the collection and 
analysis of longitudinal data. The fixed costs of beginning or 
restarting the collection of data loom much larger than con 
tinuing longitudinal sets once started. Research on the labor 
force and work-related issues would consequently suffer if 
longitudinal data collection were halted or significantly 
reduced.
Also, different federal agencies are the sponsors of various 
longitudinal surveys. Given the diversity of sponsorship, it is 
important to have a means for fostering coordination so as 
to avoid both overlap and omission. While cross-sectional 
data can tell us "how many," longitudinal data centers on 
"who," "why," and "do policies make a difference?" 
Sound social investment in data should include significant 
allocations to these newer surveys.
We also believe that administrative data can be put to 
much better uses than they are currently given in many cases. 
The administrative data are already being collected as part of 
program operations, and they often can provide a rich 
longitudinal data source. In some cases administrative data 
remain an untapped gold mine. Government agencies should 
further explore linking administrative and survey records.
Misplaced Savings
While strict budget constraints have been applied to most 
areas of nondefense spending, there are indications that cer 
tain recent decisions in the area of labor force measures may
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be penny wise but pound foolish. For example, six years ago 
Congress mandated the establishment of a commission 
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the federal 
employment and unemployment statistics. Following the re 
quirements of the law, in October 1981 Secretary of Labor 
Raymond Donovan reported on the disposition of the Na 
tional Commission on Employment and Unemployment 
Statistics report. His conclusion was that because of 
budgetary constraints, he would not implement the commis 
sion recommendations that involved added outlays no mat 
ter how miniscule the costs and regardless of the potential 
returns. 6
Recognizing that this is a period in which policymakers are 
reducing public efforts, we believe that the "savings" involv 
ed here are not justified even in an era of fiscal constraint. 
Policy decisions should not be based solely on gut feeling or 
preconceived ideology. Given the vast interest, scope, and 
billions of dollars involved in productivity, training and 
other labor-related policies, it makes sense to invest in a data 
system that produces sound and relevant estimates.
A major tenet of the Reagan administration has been the 
desirability of generally reducing the powers of government 
and assigning tasks to the lowest possible levels of govern 
ment if government intervention is deemed necessary. 
Realizing, however, that the federal government cannot give 
up all its responsibility of aid to states and localities, the 
Reagan administration has favored the disbursement of 
federal funds to states through block grants. Yet it would 
seem to be unwise for the federal government to leave the 
money in state capitols without giving them some guidance 
and a helping hand in its disbursement. Economy would cer 
tainly not be served if each state developed its own data base. 
Accordingly, if the federal funds are to be distributed on the 
basis of helping the truly needy or the dependent population, 
then it will be necessary for states to possess the necessary
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statistics on which to base allocation decisions. Cognizant of 
the costs, the commission still recommended that the present 
60,000 household sample of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) be doubled. The current CPS cannot even come close 
to accomplishing the job of helping states and local govern 
ments make wise decisions based on facts.
But even to keep the CPS a true random sample and to 
provide state and local data not now available on such a 
disaggregated level in the CPS our data system requires 
detailed Census numbers. The 1980 Census cost more than 
$1 billion in 1980, and yet the funds to process and tabulate 
the state and local data were not provided at the level needed 
to meet publicly announced time schedules.
These state and local data are crucial to many other data 
series. BLS uses Census data as a benchmark for its sample 
survey data. Without an accurate benchmark, the reliability 
of estimates produced by a sample survey cannot be verified. 
At the same time, these disaggregated estimates are needed 
to form policies that move beyond our general 
macroeconomic plans. Many of our difficulties should be 
addressed on the microeconomic level, but data from sources 
such as the CPS often are not good enough to accomplish 
this needed task. 7
There are numerous signs that our labor force data system 
appears to be in for some tough times. There is a major dif 
ference between rational budget restraints and a starvation 
diet. The irony is that the latter, in the long run, will wind up 
costing us more money than the former.
For example, an investment of funds in the redesign of the 
Current Population Survey will not only save millions of 
dollars in operating costs over the next decade, but it would 
also assure the maintenance of the quality of the critical 
statistics which come from this source. Without a redesign, 
the quality of the data on which so many national and state
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and local decisions are made can be expected to deteriorate 
over time.
In fiscal 1983 the federal government will be spending 
about 20 percent less than it did in 1980 for labor force and 
other economic data and this estimate does not even in 
clude the impact of inflation. We believe that BLS Commis 
sioner Janet Norwood got to the heart of the matter when 
she recently said:
There is a problem with a statistical system that 
stands still and doesn't do new things to keep up 
with the state of the art. You are really 
deteriorating, and in five years you can be a has- 
been; the whole statistical system in the United 
States could be that way. 8
We agree with Commissioner Norwood that the system 
faces two basic forms of deterioration. BLS already has been 
forced to reduce or eliminate the industry wage survey, the 
family budget survey, occupational outlook, strike statistics, 
and labor turnover data. Many users of these and other labor 
force data are just starting to miss these important data.
Even with massive budget reductions, BLS has been able 
to maintain the basic core programs including labor force 
status, prices, wages and productivity. However, sound 
policies require more than mere grinding out of data. The 
system will become obsolete if the analysts are not offered 
opportunities to innovate and experiment. This second form 
of deterioration could wind up being an even more serious 
problem than the first form.
While public regard for numerous national institutions has 
declined, our labor force statistics system has retained the 
faith of the vast majority of Americans. The reason this in 
formation system is so widely used by the government, 
private industry, unions, the media and researchers is
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because it is prepared by a dedicated and highly competent 
cadre of experts, and it retains a high level of public con 
fidence. It has taken years of hard work and nonpartisan 
dedication to build up this good will and public confidence. 
If this trust is lost due either to inertia or lack of 
funds then public confidence will not be easily regained.
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The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides a wealth 
of data on labor force and employment conditions within the 
U.S. economy. Every month its importance is highlighted by 
one of the most widely quoted U.S. economic statistics the 
previous month's unemployment rate. Expansion of the 
survey in terms of the number of people covered and the 
number of questions asked has led to the regular publication 
of detailed indices of unemployment rates by type of occupa 
tion, by major industry and class of worker, by age, sex, and 
race, by region and by reason of unemployment. The addi 
tional information on the labor force has led to the provision 
of a smorgasbord of unemployment measures based upon 
varying definitions of unemployment and labor force.
As important as the monthly unemployment rate is, my 
focus on it thus far may have the effect of understating the 
breadth of the CPS data for statistical analysis for two im 
portant reasons. First, the collection of the sample involves 
the surveying of the same household for eight months, with 
an additional eight month break in the middle. Thus the data 
base contains a significant amount of longitudinal as well as 
cross-sectional time series information. Second, the sup 
plementary surveys and data, particularly the March ques-
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dons on family income, add a wealth of additional informa 
tion. For these reasons, the CPS data base is one of the most 
valuable data sources in the United States.
The Key Policy Questions
Each of us has his/her own mental list of key economic 
policy questions. Some of the major types of questions, 
presented in an order which relates to my presentation but 
not meant to imply any judgment of relative importance, 
are:
Macroeconomic Questions
(1) How much national income has been/is being lost due 
to the incomplete utilization of labor?
(2) To what extent is "tightness" in the labor markets 
adding to inflation?
Microeconomic/Programmatic Questions
(3) To what extent are labor market imperfections im 
peding economic growth?
(4) To what extent do transfer payments reduce employ 
ment and job search incentives?
(5) How many unemployed workers could be aided by 
alternative programmatic actions?
Sub-national Data Questions
(6) What major occupation/skill classifications and 
regional locations show the greatest job vacan 
cy/unemployed worker imbalances?
Social/Personal Questions
(7) What are the social and personal costs of current 
unemployment levels?
While this list is certainly not exhaustive, it is indicative of 
the types of important policy questions which can be asked. 
The first two questions lost income and inflationary
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pressures reflect the macroeconomic costs of employment 
changes. The next three questions reflect microeconomic 
level questions and programmatic issues. Alternative pro 
grammatic actions include the traditional questions of direct 
employment versus training subsidies versus trickle down 
programs versus public works spending. The issue of per 
sonal incentives has already become a key determinant of 
policy as it affects "rich" people who once faced marginal 
tax rates of 50 percent to 70 percent. Someday "supply side" 
economics may be applied to the working poor who face 
disincentives at rates as high as 60 percent to 100 percent 
earnings. The question of labor market imperfections, which 
currently seems to be out of favor as a research topic, may be 
an extremely important aspect of our current economic 
situation as I will note later.
The sixth question on the distribution of employment is 
important because it asks whether the CPS can be an infor 
mation source which would directly remove some barriers to 
the efficient use of our nation's human resources. The 
answer to this question also has important implications for 
the optimum distribution of federal resources by type of ex 
penditure and by region. The importance of the final ques 
tion, which relates to the social and personal hardships faced 
by Americans under current labor market conditions, is, I 
hope, obvious to all.
The CPS and the 
Macroeconomic Policy Issues
The value of the CPS in answering many of these critical 
policy issues should not be underestimated. While we can 
argue about the exact definition of many of the terms in the 
survey and the alleged biases in both directions, the CPS 
usually provides unambiguous answers to the two key 
"macroeconomic" policy questions. Furthermore, any 
limitations of the "official" key unemployment rate
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measure are offset by the availability of supplementary data 
and the exhaustive analysis of these data which has already 
been accomplished.
Any uncertainty surrounding the current state of the labor 
market, as it relates to the macroeconomic issues, does not 
stem from confusion on the definition of the phrase "hidden 
unemployment," the phrase "looking for work," or the 
labor market attachment of teenagers; rather, uncertainty 
can only occur if people do not understand, or prefer to ob 
fuscate, phrases such as "9.5 percent" (the current 
unemployment rate), "10.5 million" (the current number of 
unemployed Americans), "5.9 million," (the number of peo 
ple who lost their last job) or "50 percent" (the black 
teenage unemployment rate). Certainly we are utilizing our 
labor force extremely ineffectively, and labor market 
"tightness" is providing little, if any, inflationary pressures 
on wage rates.
Some confusion relating to the macroeconomic issues may 
arise when the unemployment rate is between 4 percent and 6 
percent. However, even in these ranges sufficient supplemen 
tary data are provided to obtain good estimates of the 
macroeconomic impacts of labor force conditions. Further 
more, criticisms of the CPS unemployment rate data usually 
relate primarily to the definitions employed. Even if the 
various proposed changes were adopted, the adjustments 
would primarily affect the reported level rather than 
reported changes in the unemployment rate. As is shown in 
Figure 1, fluctuations in the unemployment rate are quite 
similar, no matter which unemployment rate definition is 
used. The macroeconomic implications, therefore, would 
not be severely affected by shifting the definitions of the 
"official" rate. By contrast, the problem in defining policy 
usually relates to weighing the relative importance of the two 
partially contradictory macroeconomic policy issues, a ques 
tion which data collection cannot hope to resolve.
Figure 1. Alternative Unemployment Rate Measures
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Returning to the present situation for a moment, I would 
like to pose the question: "If the answers to the 
macroeconomic policy questions are perfectly obvious, why 
don't we do something about the current unemployment 
situation?" Four possible answers spring to mind im 
mediately. First, we do not possess either the necessary 
policy tools or the knowledge of how to use them. Second, 
we may value even small reductions in inflation more than 
income gains. Third, the CPS data may not present the 
answers to these questions clearly enough for noneconomists 
to understand. Fourth, we may believe the present situation 
represents a temporary but necessary adjustment, which will 
allow us to eventually reach a period of relative price stabili 
ty and high employment levels.
Since we cannot delve into the minds of policymakers, 
none of these possibilities can be dismissed out-of-hand. 
However, the evidence that we can control the economy 
through monetary and fiscal policies is overwhelming. 
Therefore the first answer is not likely to provide the most 
important explanation.
The second answer is even less likely to be the primary 
driver behind current policy actions. It is well known that as 
unemployment rises, the costs rise in at least a linear fashion, 
while the inflation reducing impact rises at an ever 
diminishing rate. Public opinion polls indicating that most 
Americans are not even aware of the extent of recent infla 
tion reductions, when combined with this asymmetry of 
costs and benefits, must mean that 9.5 percent unemploy 
ment is not the rate preferred by most Americans.
One can argue that economists have been poor in com 
municating information on these policy options or the costs 
of unemployment to policymakers. That view leads directly 
to the third point. Perhaps current data, including the CPS 
data, do not adequately address the macroeconomic policy
Policy Analysis and the CPS 29
issues and relationships. Certainly, by combining compensa 
tion data (perhaps from the March CPS) with the monthly 
regional and skill unemployment and underemployment 
data, one could calculate an "income gap" measure. This 
measure would address the "income lost" question more 
directly. The loss in income could then be compared with 
either a zero baseline or perhaps more appropriately some 
arbitrary unemployment rate, or perhaps to a time when 
labor market conditions for a given percentage of the 
economy were defined as "tight." (While the latter measure 
is of course subjective, the same criticism could be leveled as 
with other commonly used indices, such as capacity utiliza 
tion or the timing of NBER reference cycles.)
The same goal emphasizing the "income gap" conse 
quences of high unemployment could also be addressed by 
changing the definition of the "official measure" of 
unemployment. Unfortunately, this would reduce the 
usefulness of the data for estimating labor market induced 
inflationary pressures. However, there are several reasons 
for suggesting that the official measure of the unemployment 
rate should concentrate on the "income gap" question 
rather than the inflation question. First, most empirical 
studies of the U.S. economy, including econometric models, 
Phillips-curve analysis, and anecdotal reports, have found 
that the relationship between unemployment and infla 
tionary pressures are variable. Thus we may be giving up a 
useful direct indicator of income lost for a less useful indirect 
measure of inflationary pressures. Second, for unemploy 
ment rates above 5 percent, which means for 10 of the last 11 
years, the changes in national income from changes in the 
unemployment rate are almost certainly more important 
than the changes in the job market pressures on wage rates 
from changes in the unemployment rate.
Third, recent evidence by Medoff and Abraham (NBER 
Working Paper 781) suggests that labor market indicators
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which measure unsatisfied demand are better for measuring 
the inflationary pressures in the economy than the 
unemployment rate. If these indices, which include the quit 
rate from the CPS, do in fact perform this function equally 
well or better than the published unemployment rate, it is 
clear we should use the unemployment rate to measure the 
loss in income and output, and these other measures to 
estimate labor market inflationary pressures.
Thus a change in the focus of the official unemployment 
rate to a measure which includes workers discouraged for 
economic reasons and those working part time for economic 
reasons would seem to be warranted. The collection of job 
vacancy data, as a supplement to the CPS would aid in 
assessing of labor market inflationary pressures, and would 
more than compensate for the change in focus of the official 
unemployment rate.
On a more mundane level, I should note that one recurring 
problem with the CPS data is the lack of reliability of the 
monthly unemployment estimates. Macroeconomists often 
find themselves "explaining away" the unemployment data 
for a given month because of sampling and seasonality prob 
lems. It may be that some policymakers, after hearing that 
"this month's data are poor" too many times, begin to 
believe the data set itself is useless. A larger sample would 
help to remedy these problems. An even more important, 
and less costly, improvement would be to stagger the CPS 
surveys during the month. This would reduce the number of 
distortions which arise as a result of extremely poor weather 
in a given week during the winter, the variability of school 
recesses in the spring, and the randomness of holidays 
throughout the year. In essence, the unemployment rate 
would be a true monthly series instead of a weekly series 
gathered only 12 times a year.
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Why Does the Current Recession Exist?
Returning to the dilemma posed earlier, perhaps current 
employment rates are tolerated, not because we lack the 
knowledge to do better, but rather because there is a belief 
that it is necessary to endure an admittedly painful but 
presumably temporary adjustment period to arrive at condi 
tions which will be substantially better in the future. This ex 
planation, I believe, should not be denigrated as either im 
plausible or as stemming from "latent Puritanism." First, I 
have run out of alternative hypotheses. Second, this ra 
tionale is often cited by policymakers when describing the 
current situation. Third, I believe there is some evidence that 
the current recession is having a significant impact upon 
American society in a way which augers well for the long-run 
health of the nation.
The data I am referring to are, for the most part, scattered 
and anecdotal. It may be that when collected and evaluated 
they would be found insignificant. However, we have all 
heard the charge that recessions are "necessary" to remove 
excessive expectations from the system. It is hardly radical to 
suggest that this view should be the subject of investigation.
Indeed, it does appear that the current economic environ 
ment is substantially reducing expectations of income gains 
in some sales. For example, until recently, it appeared that a 
serious and growing imbalance was developing between the 
compensation rates of workers in some industries, primarily 
those with industrywide collective bargaining agreements, 
and those of other workers. Casual empiricism would sug 
gest that the current recession is rectifying some of these im 
balances. Furthermore, it may be that a less severe recession, 
even if coupled with the same import problems, would not 
have served this end.
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The current recession has clearly lowered the expectations 
of most Americans in terms of expected standard of living 
increases. If these lowered expectations persist even after the 
economy begins to recover, it will be much easier for the 
economy to satisfy these expectations without inflation. 
Presumably this means less inflation through a "better" 
(i.e., lower) rate of consumption (assuming the validity of 
the permanent income hypothesis). It also may mean lower 
demands for transfer payments and hence lower taxes, and 
increased incentives for low income workers to stay in the 
labor force and accept low paying jobs and lower minimum 
wage gains.
A third example seems evident when one talks to business 
leaders who appear to be placing renewed emphasis on curb 
ing inventories, cutting overhead staffs, increasing line 
worker productivity, and improving quality control. Until 
last year, productivity growth seemed to be a national goal 
rather than a business imperative. However, the preliminary 
GNP and employment data indicate that productivity, using 
the BLS measure, rose last quarter despite a falling GNP. 
The last time that occurred was in the fourth quarter of 1957. 
Certainly one quarter's data can always reflect a coin 
cidence. Many more months of data will be needed before a 
structural trend could clearly be discerned. Nevertheless, it 
may be that a profit squeeze as disasterous as the squeeze ex 
perienced in recent months was necessary, given the structure 
of our economy, to restore productivity growth to an 
elevated role in American business decisions.
Perhaps these reorientations of expectations and goals 
would have occurred without a recession as serious as the 
one we are experiencing. Perhaps the changed views of the 
world will fail to persist. Perhaps the change is quantitatively 
unimportant. However, in the current evidence vacuum it is 
difficult to counter the charge that recessions are useful in 
this regard.
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The Key Microeconomic Policy Issues
The purpose of presenting this hypothesis, or perhaps 
more correctly, this series of conjectures, is not to argue that 
pain can be good for you even if one does feel better when 
it stops. Rather it is to suggest that some of the major 
economic problems in the United States may be 
microeconomic rather than macroeconomic in nature. (This 
may seem like an unusual position for a macroeconomist to 
take. However, I remind you that it is common for members 
of the Fed to discuss fiscal policy leaving the monetary 
policy discussions for the Congress.)
In a situation in which competitive markets exist, one 
should not need severe recessions to change expectations and 
restore primacy to questions of marginal cost and marginal 
productivity. For example, in a competitive environment, it 
would not be necessary to destroy or seriously weaken every 
company in an industry, or every worker in an industry, in 
order to convince them to act efficiently. The market should 
"discipline" companies and individuals who fail to follow 
these precepts one at a time.
This line of thought suggests that the key to solving our 
current economic problems and to avoiding severe recessions 
in the future (other than those stemming from energy 
"shocks," from crises, or from past policy errors) does not 
require only that we be better informed on the 
macroeconomic causes and consequences of policy actions; 
rather it requires us also to look at some microeconomic data 
and microeconomic solutions. While the CPS appears to be 
designed primarily to explore macroeconomic issues, it may 
be that the CPS data can be helpful in providing information 
on the microeconomic issues as well. If so, it will require 
great ingenuity by researchers in blending the CPS data with 
full longitudinal and other microeconomic data bases. Fur 
thermore, there may be areas in which it is extremely impor-
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tant to add to the current CPS survey, either on an annual or 
on a more frequent basis.
The types of microeconomic questions which could use 
more study include: (1) the extent to which industrywide col 
lective bargaining has provided monopoly gains to workers 
in those industries and consequent losses to others; (2) the 
extent to which transfer payments affect work disincentives 
(for example, combining the results of the Seattle-Denver ex 
periment, particularly comparing the differences in the 
three-year and the five-year program impacts with CPS- 
based data on the impact of unemployment compensation 
differences); and (3) the magnitude and types of barriers to 
employees changing their occupation and/or place of 
residence. These questions and other microeconomic- 
oriented questions are important not just because they would 
improve our understanding of the economy and help devise 
specific programs which would benefit many potential 
workers. The answers to these questions might also lead to 
direct program actions which would not only immediately 
improve the performance of the economy on a 
macroeconomic basis, but might also obviate the rationale 
for putting the economy through recessionary conditions as 
severe as those we are presently experiencing.
I recognize the limitations of the CPS as a microeconomic 
data source. Examples are: (1) followup after 16 months is 
nonexistent; (2) the following of workers to other locations 
is not attempted; (3) the sample size is too small for many 
cross-sectional applications. This argues for supplementing 
the data where possible from other studies, providing results 
which are admittedly preliminary and tentative, and for try 
ing to convince the government to improve the data base.
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The CPS and Occupation/Skill 
and Regional Data
In the area of data collection, the recession and govern 
ment policies have certainly caused economists to experience 
the phenomenon of "lowered expectations." However the 
cost of data collection is hardly a legitimate objection when 
economic policies are based upon the data. If 
microeconomic policies could be used to accomplish goals 
presently accomplished with macroeconomic policy, the net 
average increase in GNP and federal revenues would be in 
the billions. Collecting data is clearly cheaper than executing 
policies in ignorance.
Without belaboring the point, it is clear that additional 
data on occupation and skill classifications, on regional 
employment conditions and on demographic detail would be 
useful to policymakers. The need for a consistent com 
parable job vacancy index was noted earlier. Its usefulness 
on a regional level would be even greater than on a national 
level. When critical policy decisions on the state, local and 
federal levels are based upon poor information, or when 
billions of dollars in federal funds are distributed subop- 
timally because proper data do not exist, or when executive 
offices spend millions to "create" labor force estimates 
because the primary data are unreliable or nonexistent, no 
one gains. Information is a public good. If we underproduce 
it, we all suffer.
The Social/Personal Costs 
of Labor Conditions
As I noted in the beginning, the ordering of the policy 
questions was designed for expositional ease rather than to 
denote importance. Indeed, the last issue, the social/per 
sonal costs of unemployment, is perhaps the most important 
of all. I have saved it for last because I believe the CPS can
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be utilized as a source of information on this issue only if a 
major amount of specific supplementary data are gathered.
Certainly the CPS provides a crude but useful measure of 
the costs of unemployment. If the official measure of the 
unemployment rates is modified as I suggested earlier to 
reflect the "income gap" aspect of unemployment, the 
social/personal costs of unemployment would be shown 
even more dramatically. However, this measurement of 
these costs is far from precise. Unemployment compensation 
reduces the costs of short-run unemployment; but how can 
this be quantified? A simple measure like the unemployment 
rate will not even capture the direction of change in 
social/personal costs which result when benefits are increas 
ed. Clearly unemployment in a one-worker family is more 
serious than the unemployment of one worker in a multi- 
worker family; but how much? Clearly, full-time employ 
ment in an occupation which uses a worker's abilities only 
partially is a cost; but how is the concept to be defined?
These costs are both cyclical and secular. Secular costs are 
even more difficult to define than cyclical costs. "Poverty" 
in the United States is defined using income levels which 
would denote affluence in other nations. Indeed, to the ex 
tent that "poverty" is relative, winning the war on 
"poverty" can be accomplished only by equalizing all in 
comes. Indeed, the definition of secular social/personal 
costs is, I believe, impossible.
If we accept the concept of costs in a cyclical rather than a 
secular framework, it may be possible to quantify the 
social/personal costs of a given level of economic perfor 
mance. My suggestion for accomplishing this goal is to 
measure changes in consumption patterns rather than 
changes in income patterns. One could, using surveys, 
measure the changes in the consumption behavior of in 
dividuals. Shifts in consumption patterns away from "lux-
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uries" toward "necessities" would represent personal 
distress. The changes associated with unemployment would 
therefore be included in this measure. In addition, other 
causes of hardship would also be included. A forced wage 
cut, the absence of overtime or of full-time employment, 
underemployment, or an oil price "shock" may all lead to 
personal costs which would be reflected in a consumption 
based index.
This approach would have several additional advantages. 
It solves the problem of newly unemployed workers facing 
different levels of distress as a result of different asset 
holdings. It also solves the problem of adjusting the distress 
of unemployment for the existence of income replacement 
programs in any particular year. Finally it also enables one 
to deal with people's ability to change their style of social 
organization in response to unemployment changes. (If a 
teenager loses his/her job, he/she may be forced to move 
back with his/her parents. The teenager may be distressed, 
but the consumption pattern may indicate a minimal social 
cost.)
The concept, as I have presented it, is obviously extremely 
rough. Not only have I made no effort to refine it, but the ef 
forts would have been unsuccessful even if I had. Years of 
gathering primary data, trying to construct an index, and 
finally observing the index would be required to develop a 
good measure of personal social distress. However, I do 
believe that such an indicator is presently lacking and its ad 
dition to our list of economic indicators would substantially 
add to our understanding of the economy, thereby leading to 
better policy decisions. Without the addition of 
consumption-oriented data, it may not be possible to create a 
satisfactory index of the personal costs of unemployment.
Unfortunately, the costs of gathering these data and per 
forming the theoretical and empirical work necessary to con-
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struct an index are not small. The decision on whether or not 
to proceed will not be easy. However, it seems to make little 
sense to debate social program changes involving billions of 
dollars in a vacuum because the data necessary to evaluate 
the social/personal impacts have simply not been collected.
Conclusions
Four types of key policy questions which relate to the CPS 
have been identified. With respect to the first type the 
macroeconomic questions several suggestions have been 
presented. First, the focus of the official measure of 
unemployment should be shifted from industry labor market 
tightness to quantifying the loss in national income due to 
unemployment. This could be accomplished either by con 
structing a direct income gap measure, or by including 
workers who are either discouraged or working part time for 
economic reasons in the official unemployment measure. A 
job vacancy index, or existing CPS data such as the "quit 
rate" should be used to measure the inflationary pressures 
resulting from labor market conditions. Second, the amount 
of monthly randomness of the data should be improved by 
staggering the survey weeks to create a true monthly (rather 
than recurring weekly) unemployment index. Expanding the 
sample would also help in this regard.
The second type of question the microeco- 
nomic/programmatic questions is often viewed as relating 
to narrow issues. This view may well be incorrect. Indeed, 
our failure to deal successfully with the microeconomic inef 
ficiencies in our economy may be a major factor leading to 
our present sub-par macroeconomic performance. Although 
the CPS is not well-equipped to deal with these issues by 
itself, it can make a major contribution to our understanding 
of these issues if combined with longitudinal, experimental, 
and other supplemental data.
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With respect to the sub-national data questions, both the 
usefulness and the deficiencies of the CPS are well-known. 
Extra data gathering efforts in this area would, I believe, be 
extremely cost efficient in terms of improving our economic 
performance, improving the effectiveness of federal, state 
and local policy decisions, and better targeting federal 
spending programs. In addition to expanding the sample, a 
separate effort to collect job vacancy indices as a supplement 
to the CPS data would be helpful.
The final type of question the personal/social costs of 
labor conditions is extremely difficult to answer. In order 
to address these questions properly, I believe it may be 
necessary to restrict the question to cyclic rather than long 
term costs. Even so, it is probably necessary to supplement 
the CPS data with consumption-oriented survey data and a 
new index based upon changes in family consumption pat 
terns. Thus the costs of collecting the data and constructing 
the index will be high. However, the value of the additional 
information is also likely to be great.
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The Hardship Consequences 
of Labor Market Problems*
Robert Taggart 
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Who Really Suffers?
How many really suffer as a result of labor market prob 
lems? This is one of the most critical yet contentious social 
policy questions. In many ways, our social statistics exag 
gerate the degree of hardship. Unemployment does not have 
the same dire consequences today as it did in the 1930s when 
most of the unemployed were primary breadwinners, when 
income and earnings were usually much closer to the margin 
of subsistence, and when there was no safety net for those 
failing in the labor market. Increasing affluence, the rise of 
multiple-earner families, the growing predominance of 
secondary earners among the unemployed, and improved 
social welfare protections, have unquestionably mitigated 
the welfare consequences of joblessness. Earnings and in 
come data also overstate the dimensions of hardship. Among 
the millions with hourly earnings at or below the minimum 
wage level, the overwhelming majority are from multiple- 
earner, relatively affluent families. Most of those counted by 
the poverty statistics are elderly, handicapped or have family 
responsibilities which keep them out of the labor force, so 
the poverty statistics are by no means an accurate indicator
"This paper was adapted from Hardship (Kalamazoo, MI: The W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 1982).
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of labor market failure. Moreover, in-kind benefits which 
reduce cash needs are not considered in the poverty 
measures.
Yet there are also many ways our social statistics 
underestimate the degree of labor market-related hardship. 
The unemployment counts exclude the millions of fully 
employed workers whose wages are so low that their families 
remain in poverty. Low wages and repeated or prolonged 
unemployment frequently interact to undermine the capacity 
for self-support; since the number experiencing joblessness 
at some point during the year is several times the average an 
nual unemployed, the number who suffer as a consequence 
of forced idleness can equal or exceed the monthly 
unemployment levels even though only a minority of those 
unemployed in any month really suffer. For every person 
counted in the monthly unemployment tallies, there is 
another working part time because of the inability to find 
full time work, or else outside the labor force but wanting a 
job. Finally, income transfers in our country have always 
focused on the elderly, disabled and dependent, neglecting 
the needs of the working poor, so that the dramatic expan 
sion of cash and in-kind transfers has not necessarily 
alleviated labor market-related hardship.
Mountains of facts, figures and learned treatises have been 
marshalled to prove that the truly needy are few and far be 
tween. An equally imposing volume of contradicting 
evidence documents uncounted and unmet basic needs. The 
result is confusion. It is uncertain and bitterly disputed 
whether those suffering seriously as a result of labor market 
problems number in the hundreds of thousands or the tens of 
millions, and, hence, whether high levels of joblessness can 
be easily tolerated or must be countered by job creation and 
economic stimulus, whether the safety net needs dismantling 
or strengthening, and whether the long term hardship trends
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justify a "laissez faire" response or demand fundamental 
restructuring of labor markets and the income distribution 
system. There is only one area of agreement in this 
debate that the existing poverty, employment and earnings 
statistics are inadequate for one of their primary applica 
tions: measuring the welfare consequences of labor market 
problems.
Thus, the hardship measurement system was developed to 
determine who really suffers as a result of joblessness, low 
earnings and involuntary part-time employment. Available 
employment, earnings and poverty data are structured into a 
set of core indicators which incorporate alternative need and 
workforce attachment standards, which assess the severity of 
problems as well as the numbers affected, which consider 
earnings from both an individual and family perspective, as 
well as considering supplementary income including in-kind 
aid. The aggregate measures, in turn, are disaggregated to 
identify the relative hardship burdens for different popula 
tion segments and to learn more about the causes and cures 
for hardship.
The Dimensions of Hardship
The Basic Indicators
The hardship measures are designed to address six basic 
questions:
  Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE) - How many 
persons who participate in the workforce during the 
year are unable to earn at least the minimum wage 
equivalent for their total hours of work availability?
  HE Deficit - What additional earnings are needed to 
raise the wages and salaries of these individuals with 
inadequate earnings to the minimum wage level?
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  Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE) - How many 
workforce participants are in families whose total 
wages and salaries are below the poverty level?
  IFE Deficit - For workforce participants with Inade 
quate Family Earnings, what is the shortfall between 
family earnings and poverty thresholds?
  Inadequate Family Income (IFI) - How many 
workforce participants have family incomes below the 
poverty level?
  IFI Deficit - How many dollars of added earnings or 
other income are needed to raise the families of 
workforce participants in the IFI out of poverty?
Based on the work experience, income, earnings and other 
information collected in the March Current Population 
Survey covering the preceding calendar year, these questions 
can be answered for each year since 1974, with the latest 
available data covering 1980. The derivation and dimensions 
of hardship are best illustrated using 1979 as a baseline, since 
this was the last year when the economy was reasonably 
healthy:
1. Inadequate Individual Earnings (HE). During 1979, 
seven of every ten persons age 16 and over worked or 
looked for work in the civilian labor market. Among 
these 117.0 million participants, one of every four, or 
28.3 million, had annual earnings less than the amount 
each would have earned if paid the minimum wage for 
all hours they were willing and able to work during the 
year (Chart 1).
2. HE Deficit. To raise the earnings, of these individuals 
up to the minimum wage equivalent for their hours of 
availability would have required $52.0 billion in addi 
tional earnings, which represented 4.0 percent of the 
nation's total wages and salaries. The average worker
Chart 1 
Persons in Severe Hardship, 1979
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in the HE needed $1,839 in added annual earnings to 
reach the minimum wage equivalent.
3. Inadequate Family Earnings (IFE). Not all these in 
dividuals were economically deprived as a result of 
their earnings shortfalls, while others, who themselves 
earned at least the minimum wage equivalent, never 
theless lacked the annual family earnings required to 
escape poverty either because of their own limited 
hours of availability for work, their large families, or 
the lack of supplementary family earners. Two-thirds 
of the 28.3 million persons with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings lived in families with combined earnings 
above the poverty level, leaving only 9.1 million in 
families unable to achieve minimal self-support by the 
work of family members. On the other hand, there 
were 4.2 million workforce participants with adequate 
individual earnings relative to their hours of availabili 
ty who were in families with below-poverty earnings. 
These 13.3 million workforce participants with Inade 
quate Family Earnings represented 11.4 percent of the 
total workforce.
4. IFE Deficit. Workforce participants with Inadequate 
Family Earnings needed an additional $31.7 billion in 
wages and salaries to raise their families' earnings to 
the poverty level. This IFE Deficit represented 2.4 per 
cent of the nation's total wages and salaries and 
averaged $2,384 for each workforce member in the IFE 
count.
5. Inadequate Family Income (IFI). Of the 13.3 million in 
the IFE, 2.8 million were in families lifted out of 
poverty by the receipt of private pensions, alimony, in 
terest and other nontransfer income. Cash transfers 
such as welfare and social security, raised an additional 
3.4 million above the poverty threshold. Thus, just
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over half of the individuals with Inadequate Family 
Earnings also had Inadequate Family Income. This 7.1 
million in the IFI represented 6.0 percent of the 
workforce and two-fifths of the poor age 16 and over.
6. IFI Deficit. Transfers and other sources of income 
reduced the $31.7 billion IFE Deficit by almost three- 
fifths. The $12.8 billion IFI Deficit for poor families 
with members in the workforce represented over half 
of the nation's total poverty deficit. To alleviate pover 
ty among the working poor would have required an ad 
ditional $1,818 in earnings supplements for each 
workforce participant with Inadequate Family In 
come.
Hardship and Workforce Attachment
These measures of severe hardship counted all individuals 
participating in the workforce during 1979, including some 
holding or looking for part-time jobs so that they were 
available for work just a few hours over the year, but others 
in the labor force full-time, year-round. Although seven of 
every ten workforce participants in 1979 worked or looked 
for work at least 50 weeks, only half of those with Inade 
quate Individual Earnings were available full-year (Chart 2). 
Among the workforce participants in the IFE and IFI, only 
three-fifths participated for half a year or more and just two- 
fifths were full-year participants.
Increased workforce attachment reduced the probability 
of economic hardship (Chart 3). The rates of Inadequate 
Family Earnings and Inadequate Family Income among par 
ticipants in the workforce less than half the year were more 
than four times the rates among full-year participants. Ob 
viously, families with full-year participants had more hours 
of potential employment and were, therefore, more likely to 
have family earnings above the poverty level. Yet the in-
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Chart!
Severe Hardship Counts by Work Force Attachment During 1979
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Chart 3 
Incidence of Hardship by Work Force Attachment, 1979
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cidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings among less than 
half-year participants was also greater than among full-year 
participants, even though the adequacy of each person's 
yearly earnings was judged relative to his or her estimated 
annual hours in the workforce.
Alternative Adequacy Standards
The attainment of minimum wage earnings for individuals 
and poverty threshold earnings for families is hardly a cause 
for rejoicing. For an urban family of four, the lowest-level 
food menu of the Department of Agriculture, dinner out at a 
low-priced restaurant once every two months, minimally 
adequate rental housing, no out-of-town trips, auto owner 
ship by just half of families, a movie for the children once a 
month, no cigarettes, and a six pack of beer three times a 
month for the family, would have cost an estimated $12,000 
in Autumn 1979. The 1979 poverty level for a nonfarm fami 
ly of four represented less than three-fifths of this BLS lower 
living standard. If one parent worked full time and the other 
worked part time at the $2.90 minimum wage in 1979, their 
combined family earnings would have been less than three- 
fourths of the standard; and even if both earned 150 percent 
of the minimum wage, they would have just achieved the 
lower living standard.
The use of less severe earnings and income standards in 
creases the hardship counts and related deficits (Chart 4). 
Calculating the HE on the basis of 125 percent, rather than 
100 percent, of the minimum wage for all hours of availabili 
ty, raises the HE tally among total workforce participants by 
45 percent; while comparing family earnings and incomes to 
125 percent rather than 100 percent of the poverty level raises 
the IFE count by 30 percent and the IFI count by nearly half.
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Chart 4
Hardship Among 1979 Work Force Participants 
Under Alternative Adequacy Standards
(Numbers In Thousands)
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What Causes Hardship
Labor Market Pathologies
The unemployment rate is our nation's most carefully 
scrutinized and widely quoted social indicator, to a large ex 
tent because of the presumed association between joblessness 
and economic deprivation. Each week of forced idleness 
reduces annual earnings and increases the chances that in 
dividual and family earnings will be inadequate. Almost all 
of the 1979 workforce participants who were unemployed or 
discouraged for two-thirds or more of their weeks in the 
labor market had annual earnings below the minimum wage 
level for their yearly hours of availability (Chart 5). Yet 
among those unemployed less than a third of their weeks in 
the labor force, two of every three had at least minimally 
adequate individual earnings over the year. Since this group 
with shorter duration unemployment represented three-fifths 
of those experiencing unemployment, only half of all the 
unemployed had Inadequate Individual Earnings, among 
whom three of every five resided in families with combined 
earnings above the poverty level. Just one of every seven 
workforce participants who experienced unemployment dur 
ing the year resided in a poor family.
Workforce participants who experienced unemploy 
ment (000) 18,468
- Unemployed with adequate individual earnings -8,591
= Unemployed in HE 9,877
- Unemployed with Inadequate Individual Earnings
but family earnings above poverty level -6,169
+ Unemployed with adequate individual earnings 
but Inadequate Family Earnings +502
= Unemployed in IFE 4,210
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- Unemployed in IFE lifted out of poverty by non- 
transfer income -548
- Unemployed in IFE lifted out of poverty by cash
transfers -1,044
= Unemployed in IFI 2,618
Thus, unemployment and economic hardship were hardly 
synonymous. Over half of those who experienced unemploy 
ment during 1979 resided in families with incomes above 
$15,000, or just below the median family income level, com 
pared with only 6 percent of labor force participants includ 
ed in the IFE count, and virtually none of those included in 
the IFI count (Chart 6).
Low hourly earnings and limited hours of employment, 
rather than unemployment, were the major causes of hard 
ship. Two-thirds of the 28.3 million workforce participants 
with Inadequate Individual Earnings, and a similar propor 
tion of the 13.3 million with Inadequate Family Earnings, 
experienced no unemployment during the year. There were 
6.4 million low-paid workers who were employed full time 
during all weeks of participation yet did not earn the 
minimum wage equivalent for their hours of availability. 
Likewise, one of three persons with Inadequate Family Earn 
ings, and a fourth of these with Inadequate Family Income, 
had full-time jobs during all their weeks in the workforce. 
Thirty-five percent of part-time workers who were employed 
all weeks of participation did not earn the minimum wage 
equivalent for their hours of availability, and they accounted 
for over two-fifths of the persons with less than minimum 
wage earnings.
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Employed full time all weeks
Employed part time voluntarily some 
or all weeks, no unemployment
Employed part time involuntarily, 
some or all weeks
Unemployed one-third or fewer 
weeks in workforce
Unemployed one-third to two-thirds 
weeks in workforce
Unemployed over two-thirds of weeks 
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Breadwinners and Breadwinning 
Responsibilities
Because needs increase with family size, the welfare conse 
quences of low individual earnings are more serious for 
breadwinners who must support large families. Where there 
are many mouths to feed, minimum wage equivalent earn 
ings are not a passport out of poverty even with full time, 
full-year employment. But many breadwinners with 
numerous dependents also have limited annual hours of 
work availability and of actual employment.
Among the 13.3 million workforce participants with 
below-poverty family earnings in 1979, and the 5.7 million in 
the full-year IFE, 4.2 million and 1.2 million, respectively, 
earned above the minimum wage equivalent for their annual 
hours of availability. Conversely, among the 28.7 million 
total workforce participants, and 14.2 million full-year par 
ticipants, with Inadequate Individual Earnings in 1979, only 
9.1 and 4.5 million, respectively, were in families with below- 
poverty earnings.
The probabilities that persons with Inadequate Individual 
Earnings will be members of families with below-poverty 
earnings, or that family earnings will be inadequate despite 
adequate individual earnings, increase with the number of 
dependents per worker. For instance, the IFE incidence 
among workers in families with two workforce participants 
were as follows:
Incidence of Incidence of
Inadequate Family Inadequate Family
Earnings Earnings
among workers among workers
with Inadequate with Adequate
Individual Earnings Individual Earnings
Two in family 18.9% 1.4%
Three in family 17.9 1.2
Four or five in family 26.7 2.3
Six or more in family 46.9 9.3
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The likelihood of Inadequate Family Earnings declines 
when there are more breadwinners in a family and when they 
have greater labor force attachment. As an example, 1979 
workforce participants from families with four or five 








Three or more full-year participants in family 1.6% 
Three or more in workforce at least one week 3.0
Two full-year participants 5.5 
Two in workforce at least one week 8.6
One full-year participant 12.3 
One in workforce at least one week 20.5
Work and Welfare Overlap
Income transfers mitigate the welfare consequences of 
labor market problems, but many workers and their 
families, including millions with substantial workforce par 
ticipation, fall through the safety net. In-kind aid provides 
some relief, but adding the estimated value of in-kind food 
and housing aid only modestly reduces the number of 
workforce participants in poverty.
Of the 13.3 million workers in families with earnings 
below the poverty level in 1979, 2.8 million were lifted above 
the poverty line by nontransfer earnings supplements such as 
private pensions, alimony, dividends and interest. Cash 
transfers then lifted a third of the remaining 10.5 million out 
of poverty. Adding the value of food stamps to the cash in 
comes of recipient families reduced the working poor by
Chart 6
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another 0.5 million, while adding the value of free school 
lunches and housing subsidies reduced the total an additional 
0.3 million. In other words, poverty among workforce par 
ticipants was reduced a third by cash transfers, while cash 
and in-kind transfers (excluding health care) reduced the 
number of working poor by two-fifths. Cash assistance 
reduced the IFI Deficit by $11.2 billion, or almost half, and 
if food stamps, school lunches and housing benefits received 
by the working poor were "cashed out," their poverty deficit 
would have been cut by an additional $2.4 billion.
Hardship Counts
Workforce participants in 
families with below poverty 
earnings (IFE)





= Workforce participants 10,457 
who would be poor without transfers (IFI 
Net-of- 
Transfers)
-Lifted out of poverty by cash 
transfers -3,402
= Work force participants in 
poverty (IFI) 7,055
-Lifted out of poverty by ad 
dition of value of food stamps 
to cash income -533
-Lifted out of poverty by ad 
dition of value of housing sub 
sidies and school lunches to 
cash income and food stamps -281
= Work force participants in 6,241 
poverty counting in-kind aid as 




Family earnings deficit of 
workforce participants in 
families with below poverty 
earnings (IFE Deficit) $31,656
-Reduction in family earnings 
deficit resulting from non- 
transfer earnings supplements -7,650
= Poverty deficit of families 24,006 
with workforce participants if 
cash transfers excluded (IFI 
Net-of-Transfer Deficit)
-Reduction in poverty deficit 
resulting from cash transfers -11,181
= Poverty deficit of families 12,825 
with workforce participants 
(IFI Deficit)
-Reduction in poverty deficit 
if food stamps counted as cash 
income -1,916
-Further reduction in poverty 
deficit if value of housing sub 
sidies and school lunches added 
to cash income and food 
stamps -530
= Poverty deficit of families 10,379 
with workforce participants 
when in-kind aid value includ 
ed with cash income (IFI In 
cluding In-Kind Aid Deficit)
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The Burdens of Hardship
Hardship, like unemployment, is most likely to affect 
women, minorities, younger and older workforce par 
ticipants, persons with limited education, workers in blue- 
collar and service jobs, and residents of nommetropolitan 
areas and large central cities. As a general rule, the burdens 
of hardship are even more maldistributed than the burdens 
of unemployment.
Sex
The incidence of unemployment among female workforce 
participants was only slightly above that for males. In con 
trast, females were 1.4 times as likely as males to have Inade 
quate Family Earnings and Inadequate Family Income, 
while the incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings was 
1.9 times higher among women than among men. Though 
males were much more often primary breadwinners, the sex 
differentials in hardship rates were substantial, and far 
greater than the differentials in unemployment rates, for 
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Race
Black workforce participants were 1.7 times more likely 
than whites to experience unemployment during the year, 
and they were 1.5 times as likely to have Inadequate In 
dividual Earnings. But the black IFE was 2.5 times that of 
whites, while blacks were 3.4 times as likely to have Inade 
quate Family Incomes. Similarly, Hispanics were half again 
as likely as whites to experience unemployment, but the IFI 





ment year HE IFE IFI
Whites 5.1% 14.7% 22.9% 9.8% 4.8%
Blacks 12.2 24.2 34.6 24.1 16.4
Hispanics 8.3 22.0 28.5 16.0 15.5
Age
The incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings was 
twice as high among workforce participants age 65 and over 
as among those age 25 to 44, and the incidence of Inadequate 
Family Earnings among older workers was 5.4 times that 
among prime age workers, although income transfers 
equalized the IFI rates. Teenagers were three and a half times 
as likely as prime age workers to have Inadequate Individual 
Earnings.












































The incidence of hardship declined significantly with in 
creased educational attainment. High school dropouts were 
2.6 times more likely than college graduates to experience 
unemployment during the year, but the HE, IFE and IFI 
rates for dropouts were, respectively, 3.7, 4.3 and 5.5 times 
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Occupation
The incidence of unemployment among operatives, 
laborers, farm and service workers was 2.8 times the in 
cidence among professional, technical, managerial and ad 
ministrative workers, but the HE, IFE and IFI rates were 
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16.8 44.8 20.2 10.9
Location
Workforce participants residing in nonmetropolitan areas 
had the same probability of experiencing unemployment as 
those in metropolitan areas, but their chances of having In 
adequate Individual Earnings were two-fifths higher, while 
the rates of Inadequate Family Earnings and Inadequate 
Family Income were half again those of metropolitan-area 
workers. The unemployment incidence in central cities of 
SMSA's with over one million population was 1.3 times the 
incidence in surrounding suburbs; the large central city IFE 
and IFI rates were 1.8 and 2.3 times those of suburban areas.








































The incidence of Inadequate Individual Earnings declined 
noticeably over the 1974-1980 period; the incidence of Inade 
quate Family Earnings declined modestly, while the in 
cidence of Inadequate Family Income actually increased.
Comparisons between the low unemployment years, 1974 
and 1979, and the high unemployment years, 1975 and 1980, 
are the best indicators of these multi-year trends. The severe 
hardship HE dropped by 1.6 percentage points between 1974 
and 1979, and 1.4 percentage points between 1975 and 1980. 
The IFE rate fell by 0.2 percentage points in the first period 
and 0.4 percentage points in the second. The IFI rose by 0.5 
percentage points between 1975 and 1980.
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The moderate and intermediate hardship HE and IFE 
totals increased relative to the severe hardship totals, while 
the moderate and intermediate hardship IFI totals declined 
relative to the severe hardship IFI. For instance, the severe, 
moderate and intermediate hardship IFE rates all dropped 
0.4 percentage points between 1975 and 1980, so that both 
the intermediate and moderate hardship IFE counts increas 
ed in proportion to the severe hardship IFE count. The pat 
terns were reversed in the case of the IFI, where the severe 
hardship incidence rose 0.3 percentage points between 1975 
and 1980, while the intermediate hardship IFI incidence rose 
by 0.1 percentage points and the moderate hardship IFI in 
cidence declined by 0.3 percentage points, thus reducing the 
differential between the moderate and intermediate hardship 
IFI counts and the severe hardship IFI.
The Unraveling Safety Net 
for the Working Poor
The incidence of Inadequate Family Income did not 
decline between 1974 and 1979, and actually rose between 
1975 and 1980 because of the declining effectiveness of the 
safety net for the working poor. The impact of nontransfer
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earnings supplements increased significantly over the period, 
but the diminished impact of cash transfers more than offset 
this favorable development. For instance, nontransfer earn 
ing supplements raised 16.2 percent of the IFE out of pover 
ty in 1975 compared to 19.5 percent in 1980, an increase of 
3.3 percentage points. Yet transfer and nontransfer earnings 
supplements combined lifted 47.3 percent of the working 
poor out of poverty in 1975, but only 44.0 percent in 1980, a 
decline of 3.3 percentage points. Among workforce par 
ticipants who would have been poor in the absence of cash 
transfers, 37.1 percent were raised out of poverty by cash 
benefits received in 1975, compared to only 30.4 percent in 
1980.
This drop occurred despite a slight decline in the real net- 
of-transfer IFI average deficit between 1974 and 1979, as 
well as between 1975 and 1980. It was not explained by 
changing workforce composition or work experience pat 
terns. For almost all subgroups in the workforce, there was a 
noticeable drop in the poverty reduction impact of transfers.
The effectiveness of the safety net diminished as well for 
the nonworking poor. Yet the slippage was greater among 
the working poor. For instance, 50.7 percent of all persons in 
households with no workforce participants in 1975 were 
lifted out of poverty by cash benefits compared to 49.1 per 
cent in 1980. This 1.6 percentage point drop compared to a 
6.7 percentage point drop in the proportion of otherwise 
poor families with at least one workforce participant who 
were lifted out of poverty by cash transfers.
Hardship Over the Business Cycle
Hardship rises in recessions and declines during periods of 
economic growth (Chart 7). The annual unemployment, HE 
and IFE rates were highly correlated over the 1974-1980
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period, although there was a lesser correlation between the 






















However, the proportional fluctuations in hardship were 
less severe than those in unemployment, since many of the 
victims of recessions were already in hardship and their 
situation deteriorated. In the 1974-1975 and 1979-1980 
declines, the percentage increases in unemployment were 







































The standard deviation of the average annual unemploy 
ment rate over the 1974-1980 period was 15 percent of the 
mean; the standard deviation in the HE, IFE and IFI rates 
were 7, 7 and 9 percent of their respective means.
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The Victims of Recession
Though recessions exacerbate conditions for those who 
suffer continuing structural employment problems, they also 
undermine the well-being of the more advantaged segments 
of the labor force who seldom face hardship under normal 
circumstances.
—Prime age (25- to 44-year old) workers were under- 
represented among those in hardship in 1974, accounting for 
29 percent of persons with Inadequate Family Earnings com 
pared to 40 percent of the workforce. Yet 43 percent of the 
1974-1975 increment in the IFE were prime age workers.
—Male family heads were also underrepresented among 
those in hardship, accounting for 40 percent of the 1974 
workforce but only 27 percent of the persons in families with 
below-poverty earnings in 1974. Nevertheless, they ac 
counted for 40 percent of the 1974-1975 increase in the IFE.
—Workers who had completed some post-secondary 
education accounted for 28 percent of the workforce but on 
ly 14 percent of the persons in families with below-poverty 
earning in 1974. They represented 25 percent of the reces 
sionary increment in the IFE count.
—Whites, who constituted 89 percent of the 1974 
workforce but only 76 percent of the IFE, accounted for 92 
percent of the 1974-1975 IFE increase.
In the 1979-1980 recession, the same patterns prevailed but 
were generally less pronounced, as suggested by the ratio of 
each advantaged subgroup's share of the recession increment 
of the IFE divided by its share of the pre-recession IFE.
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Share 1974-1975 Share 1979-1980 
IFE increment IFE increment
Share 1974 IFE Share 1979 IFE
Male family heads 1.47 1.15
Workforce participants 
who had completed some 
post-secondary education 1.79 1.27
Whites 1.21 1.04
Prime age workers (25- to 
44-year olds) 1.47 1.58
Policy Implications
The Remedies
To significantly alleviate labor market-related economic 
hardship will require a combination of macroeconomic and 
targeted structural measures, combined with expanded in 
come transfers for the working poor. Full employment and 
increased minimum wages are necessary but far from suffi 
cient. Less than a fourth of the 1979 unemployed were in 
families with inadequate earnings, only one in seven were in 
poor families, and just a third of individuals with inadequate 
earnings were in families with below-poverty earnings. Thus, 
reductions in unemployment or increases in the minimum 
wage which would reduce the incidence of Inadequate In 
dividual Earnings would also affect many who were not in 
hardship. Any disemployment effects from increased 
minimum wages would be concentrated among those at the 
end of the labor queue. Regressions using 1974-1980 annual 
data suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
legislated minimum wage (as measured relative to the real 
value of the minimum wage averaged for the 1967-1980 
period) was associated with a 1.9 percentage point reduction 
in the HE rate, a 0.6 percentage point drop in the IFE rate 
and a 0.3 percentage point drop in the IFI rate. Since the
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ratio of the legislated minimum divided by the average real 
minimum ranged only from 94 percent in 1977 to 102 percent 
in 1978, or a swing of 8 percentage points, this was not a ma 
jor factor in hardship trends. A 1 percentage point decline in 
average annual unemployment was associated with a 1.2 
percentage point drop in the HE, a 0.5 percentage point drop 
in the IFE and a 0.3 percentage point drop in the IFI.
Projecting 1982 hardship levels based on this simple 
regression model for 1974 through 1980, and assuming, most 
plausibly, that unemployment will average 9 percent in 1982 
and inflation will erode only 5 percent from the unchanged 
legislated minimum wage, the HE rate will be 30.7 percent, 
the IFE rate, 14.2 percent, and the IFI rate, 8.0 percent (or 
even higher, as retrenchment in transfer benefits is greater 
than the 1970s downtrend). These projected levels for 1982 
would contrast unfavorably with the 1979 lows of 24.2, 11.4 
and 6.0 percent, respectively. Even if unemployment 
miraculously dropped to a 7.0 percent level for the year, re 
quiring a massive recovery in the summer and fall of 1982, 
and even if inflation declined to a 2.5 percent annual rate, 
the IFE would remain at 13.0 percent, almost the same as in 
1975—while the IFI would be 7.2 percent, in contrast to 6.9 
percent in 1975.
If all workers were provided minimally adequate in 
dividual earnings, hardship would not be eliminated and 
transfers would still be needed to alleviate deprivation 
among workforce participants and their families. The IFE 
would have been reduced by only 36 percent in 1979, and the 
IFE Deficit by 41 percent, if the earnings of all persons were 
augmented up to the minimum wage equivalent for all hours 
of availability. If all people living in families with below- 
poverty earnings in 1979 were provided employment at the 
usual wage for any hours of forced idleness, and their earn 
ings were then increased by 10 percent, 56 percent would 
have remained with Inadequate Family Earnings, and they
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would have needed $22.1 billion in earnings supplements to 
reach the poverty level. Thus, targeted manpower programs 
providing minimum wage employment or marginal earnings 
improvements would not eliminate the need for income 
transfers.
Allocation and Targeting
The use of hardship measures to allocate and target 
resources intended for the unemployed and underemployed 
from low-income families would yield a substantially dif 
ferent distribution among geographic areas and population 
segments than the current method of allocating and targeting 
based on unemployment shares or unemployment and pover 
ty shares. Nonmetropolitan areas would benefit substantially 
and so would the southern states. The nonmetropolitan area 
share of the IFE tally, averaged for the 1974-1980 period, 
was nearly two-fifths higher than the nonmetropolitan area 
share of average annual unemployment, and a fifth above 
the nonmetropolitan share of poverty and unemployment, 
each equally weighted. If funds were allocated based on IFE 
shares, the suburban rings of metropolitan areas would have 
received a fourth less than if unemployment shares were the 
determining factor, or a tenth less than if equally weighted 
unemployment and poverty shares were used in allocation. 
The West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Cen 
tral, West South Central, and Mountain states would have 
received a fourth more under an IFE-based allocation than 
an unemployment-based allocation, and a tenth more than 
under a poverty and unemployment share basis.
If resources were allocated according to need, and need 
were determined on the basis of the IFE share rather than the 
unemployment share, family heads (both males and females) 
would have received greater priority. Also, there would have 
been much more emphasis on helping older workers and less 
on youth employment problems. Dropouts would have 
received far more attention.
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Winners
Male family heads 






























































Adding A Third Leg to Social Statistics
These assorted findings challenge much conventional 
wisdom about how many and who are suffering as a result of 
labor market problems. The same conclusions might be 
reached by careful analysis of the detailed and disaggregated 
labor force and income data, but the hardship measures pro 
vide a systematic integration which provides new perspec 
tives to the public and policymakers who have not been able 
to piece together the hodgepodge of existing statistics. Those
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who do not like what they see from the hardship perspective 
may argue that the measures distort reality because of the 
value judgments, assumptions and technical problems im 
plicit in the measures. It may be difficult to accept that so 
many millions of Americans are unable to support 
themselves and their families even when they are lucky 
enough to find and hold jobs, that there has been little or no 
progress in alleviating hardship over recent years, that the 
burdens of labor market-related hardship are even more 
maldistributed than the burdens of unemployment, that the 
greater public concern with cyclical rather than structural 
problems may be misplaced, that a rising tide will not lift all 
boats, and that welfare and workfare must continue to 
overlap if hardship is to be alleviated for those failing in or 
failed by the labor market. It may be equally difficult to ad 
mit that the unemployment and poverty statistics, which are 
the foundation of public policy and public understanding, 
are not effective in perhaps their primary applica 
tion—measuring who and how many suffer as a result of 
labor market problems. It is certainly no easy task to learn 
an entirely new nomenclature, or to adjust and supplement 
libraries of econometric studies and esoteric analyses which 
are based on the assumption that unemployment rates are a 
good proxy for labor market-related hardship. It is a for 
midable challenge to fine-tune the hardship measures and to 
modify the underlying survey instruments and approaches in 
order to improve the accuracy and reliability of hardship 
statistics. Yet if we are seriously committed to understanding 
and alleviating the welfare consequences of labor market 
problems, then the unemployment and poverty statistics 
must be supplemented by new measures developed to in 
tegrate earnings, work experience and income data in a 
systematic way, recognizing the complexities of varying 
family status, labor force attachment and patterns of work 
experience. Social policies must, then, be redirected in light 









In the specific area of productivity data and analysis, sim 
ple labor productivity measures for the economy (or even for 
the major sectors) are no longer sufficient with the changing 
patterns of availability and cost of various inputs—and 
especially in an economy which has moved away from a 
century-long dependence upon industrial equipment driven 
by cheap energy. Measures which relate output patterns to 
the inputs of labor, materials, energy and capital are deemed 
essential. These must be coupled with sound analyses of the 
realities of "tradeoffs" of the input factors which have (or 
could) contribute to improved efficiency and/or lowered 
cost—of production and of the finished product.
Productivity measures must reflect today's realities of do 
ing business. Most of the great strides in productivity gains 
over the past century have come from technological im 
provements and discoveries—the path to greater output per 
hour (labor productivity) is through new technologies to in 
vestment in new plant and machinery and on to more effi-
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cient labor. While it is true that improvements in industrial 
organization and behavior, as well as enlightened 
management-labor relationships, also contribute to gains in 
productivity, the main engine of productivity improvement 
is through capital.
People are said to be "inquisitive, acquisitive, and lazy." 
They are "inquisitive" and search out how to do their work 
better and more efficiently. They are "acquisitive" as they 
like to acquire the tools to do their jobs better. And, they are 
"lazy" in the sense that they would rather have machines 
sweat and toil than themselves. Productivity gains are not 
achieved by people working harder, but by giving them the 
tools to work more efficiently and by giving them the incen 
tives to do so.
Labor productivity is a partial productivity measure and, 
as such, does not reflect the role of capital and the interac 
tion between labor and capital. To quote the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) in the boxed-item of their periodic 
"Productivity and Costs" report,
Although the productivity measures relate output to 
the hours of all persons engaged in each sector, they do 
not measure the specific contributions of labor, capital, 
or any single factor of production. Rather, they reflect 
the joint effects of many influences, including new 
technology, capital investment, the level of output, 
capacity utilization, energy use, and managerial skill, as 
well as the skills and efforts of the work force.
The use of partial productivity measures is appropriate, 
depending upon the circumstances and their use. For gaug 
ing the efficiency of use of all resources, be it at the national 
level or at a company, productivity measures which include 
all inputs are the appropriate ones to use.
The making of policy, be it employment, inflation or out 
put, requires empirical measures which correctly reflect our
Establishment Data & Productivity Measurements 79
economic conditions. Such measures will always include 
some degree of error, but the critical factor is that their 
trends should be as free from systematic biases as possible. 
This study will review several aspects of productivity 
measurement since such measures represent one of the main 
economic indicators of our economic well-being: the need 
for total factor productivity measures; the impact of our 
changing economic structure; the divergence between hours 
worked and hours paid; and the undermeasurement of labor 
in the real estate sector. Before embarking on the analytical 
sections, it is useful to review why productivity is so impor 
tant.
1. The "Big Picture"
The United States—and the entire free-world community 
of nations—is presently in a revolutionary situation. Unfor 
tunately, too few leaders of industry, academia or the 
government recognize this fact and its significance for the 
future. Specifically, in the late 1960s the U.S. was still the 
world's leader in world trade, in standard of living, in 
science and technology, in the world financial community, 
and in productivity. By the end of the decade of the 70s, due 
to a variety of errors of omission and commission together 
with events outside control of our national leaders, we were 
in the unenviable position of:
—Suffering three recessions in a single decade, with the 
terminal one (1980), in the judgment of some experts, conti 
nuing through 1981 and the first half of 1982.
—A complete catastrophe in productivity growth, with a 
slowdown followed by actual declines in output per hour in 
1978, 1979 and 1980 (and only about 1 percent rise in 1981).
—Rampant inflation, throughout the decade, with an in 
crease in the late 70s to levels higher than in any former 
peacetime period.
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—Unprecedentedly high interest rates, which stubbornly 
refuse conventional "cures"; and these rates in turn virtually 
assuring the collapse of the major construction sector and 
catastrophic declines in the sale and production of other ma 
jor consumer durables, particularly automobiles.
—Rates of unemployment higher than in any span since 
the "Great Depression" of the 30s.
—Tremendous loss of our "normal" international 
markets for manufactured goods, accompanied by a ma 
jor—and growing—invasion of the U.S. domestic market by 
imported manufactures, thus contributing to unemployment 
and the virtual collapse (present or almost certainly assured 
for the near future) of major mature U.S. industries.
—Persistent, very large adverse balance of payments.
As a result, the U.S. has lost its former lead in the export 
of manufactured goods, and its role as the financial 
bellwether or leader of the Western industrial world's finan 
cial community.
Due to the above combination of factors (not the least of 
which was our extremely weak comparative productivity 
growth performance) and including the apparent inability of 
U.S. leaders (of industry, labor and government) to work 
together to maximize exports, many of our basic industries 
were either already moribund or very ill indeed; and the U.S. 
living standard had already fallen to a measurable degree.
2. Total Factor Productivity Measures
The need for productivity measures that include the role 
of capital as well as labor has long been recognized by the 
economic community, especially Professors Kendrick, 
Jorgenson, Denison, and Griliches, among other productivi 
ty researchers. 1 Until recently, only labor productivity 
measures have been compiled and published on a regular 
basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the private
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business economy and six sectors. Since 1980, the American 
Productivity Center (APC) has been maintaining and 
publishing total factor productivity using Professor Ken- 
drick's approach. 2 The APC "Multiple Input Productivity 
Index" program covers the private business economy, six 
sectors, and thirty segments. Further, the APC measures of 
output and labor hours are consistent with the BLS 
measures.
Total factor productivity measures have been periodically 
published since the late 1950s. Yet, it wasn't until 1979 that 
the Rees Commission, under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 3 recommended the continuous 
availability of productivity measures which also include the 
role of capital:
Measures of multifactor productivity show 
changes in the use of all measured inputs per unit of 
output. Measures of output per worker hour may 
increase only because inputs of capital or in 
termediate goods have been substituted for labor 
inputs. Thus, measures of productivity, which are 
more complete measures of changes in productive 
efficiency, generally rise less rapidly than measures 
of labor productivity.
In any measure of multifactor productivity, 
weights are needed to determine the shares of the 
various inputs in the aggregate input measure. 
These are ordinarily determined by the share of 
total input value in some base period. The panel 
recommended that BLS experiment with combining 
labor and other inputs into alternative measures of 
multifactor productivity. 4
The BLS has taken up this recommendation and is plan 
ning to publish total factor productivity measures for the 
private business and other major sectors by the end of 1982.
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It is understood that their measure of capital and their ap 
proach to adding up the inputs will differ from that used by 
the APC.
It should also be recognized that by including capital in 
productivity measures adds to the problems of measuring 
output and labor, (see Table I). The measurement of capital 
stock presents more difficulties than measuring output or 
labor hours, yet the approaches taken to measure capital are 
consistent and theoretically sound. Such measures, then, are 
appropriate in capturing broad trends in total and partial 
productivity. 5
Labor productivity measures have been telling a rather 
gloomy story of the progress of the U.S. economy since 
1965. Before 1965, labor productivity for the private 
business economy had been rising at an average annual rate 
of 3.2 percent. Between 1965 and 1973, the growth rate fell 
to 2.4 percent; labor productivity dropped even further 
through 1979 to only a 0.8 percent rate. During the recession 
years of 1979 through 1981, its rate again fell to 0.5 percent 
rate, (see Table II).
As dismal as past economic performance is, measured by 
labor productivity, the total factor measure is even gloomier. 
Its pre-1965 rate is some 19 percent lower than when only the 
role of labor is measured. Total factor productivity (TFP) 
grew at an average 2.6 percent rate, as compared to 3.2 per 
cent for labor productivity; over the 1965-73 period, the TFP 
rate was 1.8 percent. Between 1973 and 1979, TFP was only 
one-half the labor productivity rate, 0.4 percent, and since 
1979 TFP has been declining at a 0.4 percent rate while labor 
productivity has been increasing. Thus, when capital is in 
cluded in our measure of productivity, the performance of 
the U.S. economy is worse.
It is expected that TFP measures should show slower 
growth than labor productivity. When capital is substituted
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Table I






































































































SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
NOTE: Goods producing includes manufacturing, farm, mining, and contract construc 
tion segments.
Service producing includes transportation, communications, public utilities, trade, finance 
and insurance, real estate, and services segment as defined by the American Productivity 
Center's Multiple Input Productivity approach.
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for labor, output may rise, leading to an increase in labor 
productivity. However, measured TFP would not rise as 
much since the increase in capital is also included in this 
measure. In this case, the rise in productive efficiency 
measured by labor productivity is overstated.
Table II 
Labor and Total Factor Productivity
Private Business Economy 





































SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
The Post-1965 Slowdown. The falloff in productivity 
growth rates since 1965, as well as some likely causes, has 
been well-documented elsewhere. 6 As exhibited by Table II, 
both the partial labor productivity and TFP rates have con 
sistently declined in each of the post-war subperiods: in this 
case too, labor productivity understates the slowdown. Be 
tween the 1948-65 and 1965-73 subperiods, labor productivi 
ty growth rates dropped 0.8 percentage points, or declined 25 
percent. In contrast, total factor productivity growth rates 
fell 31 percent. The 1973-79 subperiod exhibited an even 
more severe falloff in its productivity performance from the 
previous period, declining 67 percent. Again, the TFP rate 
slowed down even more, 78 percent.
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The moderation in productivity rates continued after 
1979, but much of this poor performance can be associated 
with the two (or possibly one) recessions, the last of which 
we are still experiencing at the time of this writing. It should 
be noted, however, that the recent year-to-year performance 
of productivity is slightly encouraging. In 1981, labor pro 
ductivity reversed its decline of the previous years, and rose 
at a 1 percent rate. Total factor productivity also increased 
after several years of declines, at a somewhat milder rate of 
0.4 percent. In measuring the post-1965 slowdown of pro 
ductivity, we again see that it has been much more severe 
when gauged by the more inclusive total factor productivity 
measure than when looking at labor productivity only.
3. The Changing Economic Structure
The structure of the U.S. economy has been changing over 
the post-World War II period, reflecting changing tastes and 
preferences, new technologies and products, altered resource 
availability and costs, the impact of taxes and other govern 
ment economic and social policies, as well as increasing 
foreign competition. As the economy shifts from a goods- 
producing to a more service-producing economy, these shifts 
alone would affect measured productivity.
For example, in 1950 over 17 percent of all hours worked 
were in the farm sector; by 1965 the farm sector contributed 
only 8 percent to total private business labor input. Much of 
this shift in labor was to the service-producing sector. Such a 
shift would affect measured productivity even if within each 
sector productivity did not change.
Table II presents the shifts in the U.S. private business 
economy over the past 33 years. In terms of output, there 
was hardly any change in the economy's structure between 
1950 and 1965; about 46 percent of output was from the 
goods-producing sector and 54 percent from service-
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producing industries. (There was a slight shift from the farm 
sector to manufacturing.) Between 1965 and 1975, the 
economy incurred a substantial change in its structure. Dur 
ing this tumultuous 10-year period, the goods-producing sec 
tor's share of output dropped to 41 percent, a decline of 5 
percentage points. The U.S. economy became more service- 
oriented, currently producing about 59 percent of output. 
Further, the manufacturing industries' contribution dropped 
back to its 1950 share of 31 percent.
Examination of the changing proportions of labor and 
capital inputs among the major sectors of the private 
business economy tells the same story: the U.S. is an increas 
ingly service-oriented economy. As of 1981, 60 percent of 
labor's efforts and over 66 percent of the capital stock is 
devoted to service-oriented activities including transporta 
tion, communications, public utilities, wholesale and retail 
trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and business services. 
The farm sector's claim on resources dropped dramatically 
between 1950 and 1975, but has now stabilized. (The shift 
from farm to other activities is now over and has been for 
many years.) Manufacturing continues to claim resources 
very much in the same proportions in 1981 as it did in 1950.
The Impact of Services. The question then is how this shift 
from goods- to service-producing industries has affected 
measured productivity. Many of the more serious problems 
in measuring real output and capital inputs are associated 
with the service-producing sector: defining and measuring 
real output, and defining and measuring real capital stock; 
even measuring labor inputs for the service-oriented in 
dustries is more difficult. We will see that the real estate sec 
tor is a case in point. Basically, most of services deal with in 
tangible types of outputs: financial advice, the sale of a 
house, accounting services, even economic consulting. It is 
very difficult to define what is the output of a particular ser-
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vice. It is even more difficult to measure price changes in 
order to deflate the output data.
Some analysts have attributed a proportion of the 
slowdown in productivity growth to the shift from the 
"more productive" goods-producing to the "less produc 
tive" service-producing industries. One reason many 
analysts consider service industries to be less productive is 
that output measures may be underestimated, leading to 
downward biased productivity measures. In order to ex 
amine this question, our measure of total factor productivity 
for private business economy was recalculated, holding the 
proportion of output, labor and capital inputs at their 1965 
levels (see Tables I and III).
The impact of the changing economic structure on total 
factor productivity is exhibited by Chart I. Between 1948 and 
1965 there is a marked difference in the trends of the variable 
structure total factor productivity (VS-TFP) and the con 
stant structure total factor productivity (CS-TFP). After that 
period, there is very little difference in their respective 
trends. The growth rates of TFP bear this fact out (see Table 
IV); between 1948 and 1965, VS-TFP grew at an average rate 
of 2.6 percent, some 12 percent lower than the 2.9 percent 
rate of TFP when the structure is held constant. Over the 
post-1965 subperiods, the rates of growth of both VS-TFP 
and CS-TFP are almost exactly the same.
During this earlier 1948-65 period, the proportion of out 
put changed but little (see Table I); the same is true in regard 
to capital input. The significant changes occurred in the pro 
portion of labor hours; labor hours in the goods-producing 
sector declined almost 8 percentage points, from 55.3 per 
cent in 1950 to 47.6 percent in 1965. Of course, the service- 
producing sector gained this amount. Between 1965 and 1975 
the goods-producing sector again lost share, about 6 percent, 
dropping to 41.8 percent.
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Table III




Manufacturing .325 .318 .179
Food .032 .031 .017
Tobacco .005 .001 .002
Textiles .010 .016 .007
Apparel .011 .021 .003
Lumber .011 .012 .003
Furniture .005 .007 .002
Paper .011 .012 .011
Printing and publishing .018 .017 .005
Chemicals .020 .016 .020
Petroleum .008 .003 .011
Rubber .009 .009 .004
Leather .003 .006 .001
Stone, clay and glass .012 .011 .008
Primary metals .030 .022 .029
Fabricated metals .024 .025 .010
Machinery excluding electric .034 .032 .016
Electrical machinery .025 .028 .009
Transportation equipment .044 .034 .017
Instruments .008 .008 .003
Miscellaneous manufacturers .005 .007 .002
Nonfarm nonmanufacturing .541 .524 .619
Mining .022 .012 .043
Contract construction .075 .064 .012
Transportation .051 .050 .070
Communications .023 .015 .027
Public utilities .027 .011 .061
Trade .203 .255 .077
Finance and insurance .049 .041 .015
Real estate .061 .012 .193
Services .127 .140 .176
SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
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Table IV 
Total Factor Productivity and Related Indexes
by Major Sector 
(Selected Periods, 1948-1981)
Average Annual Rates of Change 
1948-79 1948-65 1965-73 1973-79 1979-81
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Table IV (continued) 
Total Factor Productivity and Related Indexes
by Major Sector 
(Selected Periods, 1948-1981)
Average Annual Rates of Change 
1948-79 1948-65 1965-73 1973-79 1979-81









































































































SOURCES: American Productivity Center; Pace University.
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This significant gain in the service-producing sector's 
share of labor hours is reflected in the differing growth rates 
of variable structure labor productivity and constant struc 
ture labor productivity. During each of the four post-war 
subperiods examined, when the structure of output and 
labor input are held constant, the rates of growth of labor 
productivity are significantly lower. And the divergence in 
their respective growth rates increases as we approach the 
1980s. Thus, the shift from a goods- to a service-oriented 
economy has had a significant impact on labor productivity 
throughout the 1948-81 period, but not significant after 1965 
when productivity is measured using the total factor ap 
proach.
Again, we see the importance of including capital in the 
measure of productivity. Interestingly, there is little dif 
ference in capital productivity growth rates between the 
variable and constant structure measures.
Output and Inputs. Table IV also presents the impact on 
output and labor and capital input growth rates for all three 
series; and for each subperiod, when the structure is held 
constant, the growth rates are lower than in the variable 
structure case. This result is expected since an economy nor 
mally shifts output and resources to industries which are ex 
periencing greater growth in demand. Further, higher pro 
ductivity growth industries tend to have slower rising prices, 
which encourages increasing demand and output, and higher 
profit margins, which also encourages and attracts more 
resources.
Translating these increases in output, labor and capital in 
to faster-rising productivity depends upon their relative 
growth rates. As we saw, the major divergence was in regard 
to labor productivity, the difference in output growth rates 
(1948-65) was only 0.1 percentage points, yet labor input 
declined at a Q.I percentage rate when when the structure
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was held constant, as compared to an actual (variable struc 
ture) use of 0.4 percent per annum. The divergence in capital 
input growth rates over this same period was also minimal, 
0.1 percentage points. Here, too, we see that the strong shift 
in labor explains the divergence in labor productivity growth 
rates.
Within-Sector Shifts. Shifts of output and inputs within a 
sector will also impact its measured productivity growth 
rates. Apparently shifts within the goods-producing sector 
had a substantial impact on total factor productivity growth 
rates over the 1948-65 subperiod, 3.1 percent versus 3.8 per 
cent for the variable and constant structures, respectively. 
After that period, the differences are much smaller. Much of 
this difference in the early period can be attributed to shifts 
in labor among the goods-producing sectors. Since there is 
only a small difference in manufacturing VS-TFP and CS- 
TFP growth rates, most of the divergence within the goods- 
producing sector must be due to the shift from farm to non- 
farm labor in the early post-war period.
Within the service-producing sector, there is very little dif 
ference in growth rates of VS-TFP and CS-TFP. Apparent 
ly, there have been only small shifts of labor, and output and 
capital, within this sector.
Rate, Level and Interaction Effects. Gains in productivity 
can be separated into rate, level and interaction effects. The 
rate effect is the growth in productivity due to within- 
industry productivity gains. The level effect is due to shifts in 
the composition or structure of the economy, holding 
within-industry productivity constant. The interaction effect 
is a result of the interaction between the rate and level ef 
fects.
The estimates of constant structure growth rates presented 
above are approximations of the rate effect. Unfortunately, 
there is no approach available to decompose total factor pro-
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ductivity into rate, level and interaction effects. However, it 
is possible to do so for labor productivity. 7 Using a 60-sector 
disaggregation, Beebe and Haltmaier estimate the rate and 
level effects for selected subperiods: 8
Decomposition of labor productivity 




Total 3.24 2.54 1.00 
Rate 2.79 2.22 0.93 
Level 0.45 0.33 0.10
This table indicates that the level effect accounted for 13.9 
percent of the rate of productivity growth between 1948 and 
1965, 13 percent over the 1965-73 period, and 10 percent 
over the 1973-78 period. In order to isolate which sectors ac 
count for the level effect, Beebe and Haltmaier use a two- 
sector approach, isolating each sector in a separate calcula 
tion. Their findings are that farming accounts for most of 
the level effect, especially in the earliest subperiod, 0.41, 
0.18, and 0.05, for the three subperiods, respectively. Our 
constant-structure approach agrees with their findings.
4. The Hours Paid Bias
The BLS establishment survey known as the Current 
Employment Statistics Survey (709), has three major prob 
lems in regards to productivity measurement:
1. Self-employed and unpaid family workers are excluded. 
In the BLS sector estimates and the APC sector/industry 
estimates of productivity, self-employed and unpaid family 
workers are included, albeit using indirect methods. In con 
trast, direct industry estimates would be based on imputa 
tions by sector of self-employed and unpaid family worker
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employment, using estimates from the Current Population 
Survey. At least this source of bias is addressed.
2. Average hours estimates cover only production workers 
in mining and manufacturing, and all nonsupervisory 
workers in other industries. Generally, in calculating total 
hours worked, average hours of supervisory (nonproduc- 
tion) are assumed to be the same as nonsupervisory (produc 
tion) workers. As of 1977, about 18 percent of total workers 
in nonagricultural industries, and about 28 percent of mining 
and manufacturing workers had their hours estimated under 
this assumption. It is not clear what direction this assump 
tion would bias our productivity measures, if any. The trend 
has been towards working less hours per week, at least until 
the early 1960s. This trend applies to both supervisory and 
nonsupervisory workers. More likely, these estimates lead to 
a cyclical bias in that production workers' hours are lowered 
during business downturns, but nonproduction personnel 
hours generally stay the same.
3. The major problem is that the establishment survey 
measures hours paid instead of hours worked. Hours paid 
includes vacations, sick-leave, holidays, coffee breaks, and 
the like. If the difference between hours paid and worked 
had stayed the same since 1948, productivity trends would 
not be affected, and only productivity levels would be biased 
downwards.
But in reality the trend has been towards more hours that 
are paid but do not represent work. Evidence on this trend is 
sketchy but very convincing. In 1966, 83 percent of total 
compensation was for working time (all nonagricultural in 
dustries, see Table V). By 1970 this figure dropped to 81.9 
percent, and to 76.7 percent by 1977, the last year such infor 
mation was published. During this same period, pay for 
leave excluding sick went from 5.2 percent of total compen 
sation to 6.1 percent. Other evidence indicates that between
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1965 and 1976, the maximum allowable vacation of plant 
workers rose from 3.3 weeks per annum to 3.9 weeks, and 
from 3.6 weeks to 4.1 weeks for office workers. 9
This problem was addressed as early as 1976 by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 10 They recognized the impact this bias 
has on productivity measures and they attempted to rectify 
for the lack of hours worked data. After reviewing the 
several employment surveys conducted by the federal 
government, they recommended that the Current Employ 
ment Statistics Survey be expanded to include hours worked 
information.''
Table V
Percent of Total Compensation




Activity 1966 1970 1974 1977
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Pay for working time 83.0 81.9 78.2 76.7 
Pay for leave
(excluding sick) 5.2 5.6 6.0 6.1 
Vacation 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 
Holidays 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.3
Employer expenditures

















SOURCE: Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2070, U.S. Department of Labor, Table 
132, "Employee Compensation, Private Nonagricultural Economy, Selected Years, 
1966-77," December 1980, pp. 308-318.
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In their approach to defining what comprised hours work 
ed, they had several somewhat competing uses in mind, in 
cluding labor negotiations and productivity measurement. 
They finally recommended the use of the concept "hours at 
work," which they defined as "all time during which an 
employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's 
premises, on duty, or at a prescribed work place." 12
In addition to regular working time where the 
employee is engaged in productive activity, hours at 
work thus include short rest periods and coffee 
breaks, standby or ready time, downtime, portal to 
portal pay only if paid, washup time only if paid, 
travel time from job site to job site within the work 
ing day, travel away from home if it cuts across the 
working day, and paid training periods during 
working hours. Hours at work exclude normal 
travel time from home to work, unpaid wash time, 
and lunch time . . . the major items excluded from 
hours at work are vacations, holidays, and 
absences due to sickness or personal or civic 
reasons. 113
About 90 percent of paid but not at-work time is due to 
vacations. This definition does include some nonwork time 
which would be better excluded for productivity measure 
ment purposes, but these items represent a very small pro 
portion of nonwork time.
For illustrative purposes, estimated total hours paid for 
the nonfarm sector were adjusted to an hours worked basis. 
The adjustment is based on the evidence given in the BLS 
Report. 14 This table indicates that hours worked were 95.2 
percent of hours paid in 1952, and declined an average of 0.1 
percentage points per annum through 1966, the same annual 
percentage point decline as presented in Table V. Taking the 
1952 figure of 95.2 percent as a benchmark, we assumed
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through extrapolation that hours worked were 95.6 percent 
of hours paid in 1948, and 92.3 percent in 1981. (All in 
tervening years were linearly interpolated.)
Labor productivity and total factor productivity were 
calculated using adjusted hours worked labor input. Chart II 
shows the trends in the hours worked and hours paid 
measures of total factor productivity (assuming both 
measures are equal to 100 in 1948). It is clear that the hours 
paid measures are an underestimate of TFP, and that this 
bias increases over time.
The differences in rates of growth for the nonfarm sector 
are not very large, no more than 2 percentage points (see 
Table VI). But over long periods of time, small percentage 
differences in growth rates lead to substantial differences in 
levels. For example, if it is assumed that total factor produc 
tivity using hours worked and hours paid measures were 
equal in 1948—as was done for Chart II—hours paid TFP 
would rise 61.8 percent by 1981 (at a 1.5 percent rate) and 
hours worked TFP, 71.2 percent (at a 1.6 percent rate). The 
gap between these two measures widens steadily over time 
and reaches 5.8 percent by 1981.
Using hours paid rather than hours worked leads to an 
understatement of both the level and the rate of growth of 
total factor productivity and labor productivity. While this 
conclusion implies that the productivity problem facing the 
U.S. economy is not as bad as has been measured by current 
ly available data, we still must conclude that since 1965 pro 
ductivity gains have slowed down substantially and that since 
1973 they have been nonexistent.
Stafford and Duncan report that their survey "shows that 
the divergence between hours worked and hours paid ac 
counts for as much as one-third of the productivity 
slowdown." 15 Further, Norsworthy etal. report that the rate 
of change in the ratio of hours worked to hours paid for the
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Chart II
Total Factor Productivity







SOURCE: American Productivity Center.
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private nonfarm business sector was -0.06 percent from 1952 
to 1965, -0.21 for 1965 to 1973, and -0.12 from 1973 to
1975. 16
They conclude that the results are "not striking" but that 
there "is a small, persistent but variable decline in the ratio 
of hours worked to hours paid." 17 Neither we nor Nors- 
worthy attribute a significant proportion of the decline in 
productivity to the divergence between hours worked and 
hours paid. However, we are in agreement that the BLS 
should continue with their plans to expand their survey to in 
clude hours worked.
Table VI
Total Factor Productivity 
Nonfarm Sector
A. Growth Rates, Selected Periods 






B. Percent Difference in Hours Worked 
and Hours Paid**






SOURCES: The American Productivity Center; Pace University.
*For illustrative purposes only.
**Assumes that both measures equal each other in 1948.
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5. Underestimate of Labor in the Real Estate Sector
There is evidence that the Current Employment Statistics 
program underestimates labor hours in the real estate sector. 
Traditionally, much of the effort in this sector is by in 
dividuals working on a commission basis and on their own 
time. The establishment survey apparently underestimates 
the amount of labor effort by nqnpayroll personnel and, as 
such, undercounts the number of employees.
Information provided by the National Association of 
Realtors (NAR) 18 indicates that the BLS survey is only cap 
turing approximately 16 percent of the total labor force in 
this sector, which implies that a more correct estimate of real 
estate labor is about six times the published figure. Another 
source of underestimation is the average hours paid (worked) 
per week. Currently, only nonsupervisory workers are 
covered, and real estate is not broken out from the broader 
finance, insurance, and real estate sector. Therefore, this 
estimate of average hours must be used in calculating total 
real estate labor hours.
Table VII presents employee information provided by the 
NAR. 19 About 84 percent of the total workforce is made up 
of salespersons, and only 16 percent are in-office personnel. 
This number appears to be fairly stable over the 1976-81 
period. Unfortunately, no data is available prior to 1976 so 
no trend can reasonably be inferred.
The BLS estimates that nonsupervisory workers are paid 
for an average of 36 hours per week. Real estate salespersons 
average over 40 hours according to NAR surveys, and 
brokers over 50 hours per week. Here, too, we have a rather 
significant understatement of employee activity in this sec 
tor.
Finally, the distribution of gross income indicates that 
some 13 percent goes to cover payroll-type costs, and 45 per-
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cent to commissions, adding up to total labor costs of 58 per 
cent. This proportion is way below estimates of labor's share 
of total factor costs as compiled from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. In 1978 the APC has calculated that 
labor compensation, after an imputation for self-employed 
is added on, was only 8 percent of total factor costs, way 
below the figure implied by NAR data.
The data provided by the NAR are compelling. Two fac 
tors ar highlighted which signal likely labor measurement 
problems for the real estate sector:
1. The level of real output per hour for the real estate sec 
tor is almost 40 percent higher than any other nonfarm 
nonmanufacturing sector. (In 1979, output per hour 
was $27.42—in 1972 dollars—as compared to $19.76 for 
public utilities.)
2. Labor's share of factor income is the lowest of all non- 
farm nonmanufacturing sectors. (In 1978, real estate's 
labor share was 8 percent, about one-fourth the 36.5 
percent labor share of the public utility sector.)
Unfortunately, the data provided by the NAR survey 
would lead to hour and employee estimates which are 
unrealistically high. Using their data and adjusting BLS 
estimates of the number of employees and average hours for 
real estate, we would derive estimates of aggregate hours of 
13.6 billion and employment of 6.4 million workers. Even 
though these estimates are not acceptable, the NAR survey 
results do indicate that there is a substantial underestimate of 
labor effort in the real estate sector.





1. Employment by Type
(Percent of workforce)
1976 1978
Salespersons 82.2% 84.0% 












2. Distribution of Hours per Week 
1975a
Percent Percent 




under 40 40 & over
45.9 54.1 
23.3 76.7










Total labor costs 58.1 58.3 
Other costs (occupancy, 
communications, advertising, 
sales promotion, etc.) 41.9 41.7
























SOURCES: National Association of Realtors; The American Productivity Center; Pace 
University.
a. Realtor associates, salespersons and brokers.
b. Nonsupervisory worker, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.
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6. Conclusion and Recommendations
In the specific field of employment and hours data, as 
generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, several conclu 
sions are apparent:
1. To properly capture gains in productive efficiency, the 
role of capital must be included at the sector level, and in 
termediate materials and energy inputs should be added if 
measuring productivity at more detailed levels. Because of 
substitution among the various inputs, labor productivity 
measures are biased upwards.
2. The shift from a goods-producing to a service-oriented 
economy had a significant effect on measured productivity 
in the early part of the post-World War II era, but has not 
affected productivity growth rates since 1965. If productivity 
is measured by labor productivity, there appear to have been 
labor-shift effects since 1965, but these effects are incorrect. 
The shift to more services has not contributed significantly 
to the post-1965 productivity slowdown.
3. The current practice of estimating hours paid rather 
than hours worked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
significantly biases productivity growth rates downwards. 
While the bias is significant, it does not account for the 
post-1965 productivity slowdown.
4. For some sectors—especially the real estate sector—the 
true aggregate of hours devoted to gainful endeavor and the 
number of persons involved in generating the value-added 
"output" for the sector is seriously understated by the BLS 
exclusion of "non-office sales personnel." This exclusion 
undoubtedly exerts some effect in a number of the service in 
dustries, but is especially serious for real estate. According to 
the National Association of Realtors data, not less than 
three-fourths of the total number of persons gainfully 
employed by the industry (and probably an even larger
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percentage of the hours actually worked) are non-office sales 
personnel, paid for either entirely or very largely on a com 
mission basis. With this exclusion, the computation of a 
meaningful productivity level (output per hour) is not possi 
ble; and with an output per hour trend based on perhaps 20 
to 25 percent of the total human resources input, the validity 
is indeed questionable.
The technical problems reviewed here are important but 
should not detract us from some basic economic problems 
facing the U.S. economy. Our declining productivity perfor 
mance, which is clearly evident regardless of any biases in 
estimation, continues to erode our national vitality and inter 
national competitiveness. While the technical recommenda 
tions are clear—measure total factor productivity and 
measure hours at work—how we can revive our economy's 
efficiency of operation is more difficult to fathom.
As matters stand, it is obvious that the U.S. industrial 
community of the future will inevitably be altogether dif 
ferent from that of the past. If we are to avoid the fate of na 
tions in the past who fell from the position of world leader 
ship to the status of third-rate or fourth-rate powers, we 
must:
*Develop new—and high-technology—industries and ex 
pand them rapidly;
* Carry out wide-ranging actions to maximize productivi 
ty, flexibility and general acceptance of change and new ap 
proaches in existing, mature industry;
* Substantially increase diffusion throughout every seg 
ment of the industrial community of "best practice";
*Encourage development of the requisite new skills re 
quired for new high-tech industries and for the more 
automated, robotized plants of the future in extant in 
dustries;
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* Direct improvements in productivity and general opera 
tional efficiency in the growing service industry segment of 
the economy.
In addition to industrial restructuring toward services and 
technology-oriented industries and improvements in its 
overall effectiveness, it appears essential that new and im 
aginative approaches be shaped for on-going collaboration 
of the government, industry and labor to expand U.S. 
fabricated goods exports in the world marketplace, plus ef 
fective action in exporting efficient, flexible U.S. "services," 
including transportation, communications, finance and pro 
fessional services.
Further, it appears likely that the U.S. will also be 
able—as it must—to expand further its still-extant lead in the 
production and export of agricultural products. Here, again, 
new technologies (including hydroponics, photosynthesis 
and bioregulators) will be required to meet the needs of the 
twenty-first century and to help assure retention by the U.S. 
of at least a relatively high standard of living.
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Longitudinal Labor Market Data





Until recently, most research on labor force behavior and 
experience analyzed cross section data, which pertain to a 
population sample at a single point in time. Recent years, 
however, have seen the development of several longitudinal 
data bases, which follow the same individuals over multiple 
points in time.
Two factors have contributed to the development of 
longitudinal information. One is that convincing research on 
a number of public policy issues requires longitudinal data. 
Indeed, without longitudinal data, some important research 
issues cannot be addressed at all. For example, appropriate 
public policy towards poverty, unemployment, and welfare 
dependence rests partly on whether families' or individuals' 
experience of these states is typically transitory or chronic. 
Cross-sectional snapshots of the poor or the unemployed, 
which focus on different individuals at different times, can 
not possibly reveal how many of those poor or unemployed 
at one time remain poor or unemployed at later dates. Such 
questions of state persistence necessitate longitudinal track-
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ing of the same individuals. Still other issues previously ad 
dressed with cross section data can be treated with more 
reliable research methods when longitudinal information is 
available. For example, longitudinal data have enabled more 
thorough investigations of the effects of government training 
programs on earnings and the wage impact of union status.
The second factor is that the cost of developing useful 
longitudinal data sets is no longer prohibitive. In some cases, 
computerized matching of existing administrative records 
can produce inexpensive longitudinal information. In other 
cases, valuable longitudinal data bases can be generated by 
computerized matching of existing administrative and survey 
data. Even where the desired longitudinal information can 
be collected only by initiating new surveys, the advance of 
computerized data management systems has made 
longitudinal data development cost-effective in the last 15 
years.
The purpose of this paper is first to describe briefly the 
major sources of longitudinal data and their relative merits. 
The discussion then turns to a review of the types of analysis 
for which longitudinal information has proven especially 
useful.
Sources of Longitudinal Labor Market Data
Longitudinal labor market data have been generated in 
three main ways. The first is longitudinal matching of ad 
ministrative records on participants in government pro 
grams. The most prominent example is the Social Security 
Administration's Continuous Work History Sample 
(CWHS). This data set contains longitudinal earnings 
records for a sample of workers covered by the social securi 
ty program. Another example is the Labor Department's 
Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH), which con 
tains longitudinal information on the earnings, benefit ex-
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perience, and other characteristics of a sample of workers 
covered by unemployment insurance. The Labor Depart 
ment has also assembled the Continuous Longitudinal Man 
power Survey (CLMS) data, which consist partly of ad 
ministrative information on a sample of enrollees in pro 
grams funded under the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act.
Surveys are a second source of longitudinal data. 
Longitudinal survy data can be collected either through one- 
time retrospective surveys that obtain information on in 
dividuals' past experience or through panel surveys that 
periodically reinterview the same individuals. The latter ap 
proach is exemplified by the National Longitudinal Surveys 
(NLS) of labor market experience and the Panel Study of In 
come Dynamics (PSID). The NLS project, conducted for the 
Labor Department by the Census Bureau, the National 
Opinion Research Center, and Ohio State University's 
Center for Human Resource Research, has followed samples 
of several age-sex cohorts: men of age 45 to 59 in 1966, men 
14 to 24 in 1966, women 30 to 44 in 1967, women 14 to 24 in 
1968, and men and women 14 to 21 in 1979. The original 
sample size for each of the 1960s cohorts was about 5,000 in 
dividuals, and the 1979 cohort started with over 12,000 in 
dividuals. The wide variety of information collected by NLS, 
as Michael Borus [3] put it, "includes everything you always 
wanted to know about individuals that the Census Bureau 
was not afraid to ask."
The PSID effort, initiated by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare and conducted by the University of 
Michigan's Survey Research Center, has collected since 1968 
a similarly wide variety of information on a national sample 
of families that overrepresents low-income families. As some 
of the original 4,800 families have split and rearranged, 
PSID has interviewed the originally sampled individuals' 
new family units so that, despite sample attrition, the sample
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has actually grown over time. Other special longitudinal 
surveys, described elsewhere, 1 include the Longitudinal 
Retirement History Study, the National Longitudinal Study 
of the High School Class of 1972, Project Talent, High 
School and Beyond, and the NBER-Thorndike-Hagen 
survey.
Another important panel survey is the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), the monthly national household survey by the 
Census Bureau that produces the unemployment rate and 
other regular labor force statistics. Although the CPS is 
usually viewed as a source of cross section and time series 
data, it has a panel aspect as well. A household whose ad 
dress is selected for the survey is interviewed for four con 
secutive months, dropped from the survey for eight months, 
and then interviewed for another four months before leaving 
the sample for good. It is therefore possible to match the 
survey responses of a household for up to a 16-month period 
(unless the household moves from the selected address, in 
which case the household that moves in is interviewed in its 
place). Compared to the NLS and PSID data, the CPS 
longitudinal information spans a shorter period, contains 
fewer variables, and does not follow movers, but it pertains 
to a much larger sample and, unlike NLS, represents all 
demographic groups.
A third source of longitudinal labor market data is the 
series of negative income tax experiments conducted since 
the late 1960s. Each of these experiments—conducted in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Seattle and Denver, Iowa and 
North Carolina, and Gary, Indiana—set up a pilot negative 
income tax program lasting several years for a selected ex 
perimental group, and also observed a control group over 
the same period. The main purpose was to compare the labor
1. See Borus [3] and Kalachek [8] for more detailed inventories of longitudinal data bases.
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supply behavior of the two groups to estimate the likely work 
incentive effects of a national negative income tax. The data 
also can be used more generally to explore patterns of 
welfare dependence and labor market experience among low 
income families.
Before considering the analytic uses of longitudinal data in 
general, it is worth mentioning a few of the relative advan 
tages and limitations of different sources of longitudinal 
data. One important comparison is between administrative 
and survey data. In cases where administrative files contain 
the desired data on the appropriate population, the advan 
tages of administrative data are considerable. To begin with, 
longitudinal collation of data already collected in the process 
of program administration is less expensive than generating 
the data with new surveys. Consequently, longitudinal data 
bases from administrative sources often include larger 
samples than surveys can feasibly interview. Also, during the 
period of the sample's program participation, administrative 
data are relatively free of the problems surveys have with 
nonresponse and sample attrition. In addition, information 
from administrative records may, in some cases, be more ac 
curate than information elicited from survey respondents. 
Survey data on income, for example, are sometimes 
unreliable. A comparison by Herriot and Spiers [7] of CPS 
and Internal Revenue Service data on earnings of the same 
individuals showed discrepancies of at least 15 percent be 
tween the two sources of earnings information for almost 30 
percent of the matched sample. Despite the likelihood of in 
come underreporting in the IRS data, the CPS earnings data 
tended to be even lower. Earlier matched comparisons of 
CPS and census data, initial and reinterview census data, 
and census and tax data found similar evidence of income 
measurement error in surveys. 2
2. Miller [12], Miller and Paley [13], and Pritzker and Sands [16].
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On the other hand, whether administrative files do contain 
the desired data on an appropriate sample is a big "if." The 
information collected for administrative purposes is typically 
narrower than what is desired for research purposes. The 
CWHS data, for instance, include only a few variables 
besides earnings, and even earnings are measured only up to 
the social security taxable limit. The sparseness of ad 
ministrative information has led the CWBH and CLMS pro 
jects to supplement their administrative data with informa 
tion collected in interviews or questionnaires.
Furthermore, administrative data may not correspond to 
the population of interest. The CLMS data, for example, are 
insufficient by themselves for evaluating the impact of train 
ing programs on earnings because the data pertain only to 
program enrollees. A proper evaluation also requires infor 
mation on a control group not enrolled in training programs. 
Analysts of the CLMS data have resorted to CPS data 
matched with social security earnings records to obtain con 
trol group information.
In cases where some or all of the desired longitudinal data 
must be gathered in surveys, it becomes important to con 
sider the merits of retrospective versus panel surveys. Of 
course, obtaining longitudinal information retrospectively in 
a single interview is less costly than repeated interviewing. 
The retrospective, single-interview approach also eliminates 
sample attrition and yields longitudinal information more 
quickly. Furthermore, retrospective data are less susceptible 
to some types of response error. If, for example, a panel 
survey respondent describes the same job differently in suc 
cessive interviews or if different interviewers code the same 
job differently, the respondent may be erroneously recorded 
as having changed occupations. This sort of error is less like 
ly to occur if the information is collected in a single inter 
view.
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On the other hand, panel surveys are less subject to recall 
error. A retrospective survey respondent that changed jobs 
five years ago may fail to recall the old job or may forget 
when the job change occurred. Furthermore, a retrospective 
survey respondent's recollections might be biased by subse 
quent events. Of course, just as longitudinal data bases 
sometimes contain both administrative and survey informa 
tion, longitudinal surveys can fruitfully combine the 
retrospective and panel approaches. Indeed, panel surveys 
typically do collect information retrospectively for periods 
before and between interviews.
Finally, where a panel survey has been initiated, an impor 
tant question is how long to continue the survey. This ques 
tion has arisen recently with regard to whether the 1960s 
NLS cohorts, originally planned to be interviewed for 15 
years, should be followed for another 5 years. The answer 
depends partly on the advantages of having a 20-year, rather 
than a 15-year, longitudinal history. Another consideration 
is that continuation of an existing longitudinal survey is a 
relatively inexpensive way to obtain current data. Even if the 
new data will be used largely for cross section analysis, col 
lecting the data from an ongoing panel avoids the costly pro 
cess of selecting a new sample and developing a new data 
processing system.
This advantage is at least partly offset, however, by the 
sample attrition problem. By 1981, all four of the NLS 
surveys started in the 1960s had lost at least one-fourth of 
their original samples. Such attrition not only reduces sam 
ple sizes, but, if sample leavers differ systematically from 
sample stayers, it also might cause the remaining samples to 
be unrepresentative of the corresponding populations. Even 
in the PSID project, where sample sizes have grown over 
time because the survey incorporates new family units con 
taining original sample members, it is unclear how well the
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current sample represents any population of interest. 
Therefore, while extending panel surveys generates new data 
economically, it may do so at a cost of progressively less 
representative samples. This raises the difficult question of 
when it is optimal to begin a new survey as opposed to con 
tinuing an old one.
Uses of Longitudinal Data
Longitudinal data are particularly advantageous for three 
types of research: the measurement and analysis of changes 
in individuals' status over time, the analysis of intertemporal 
relationships, and analysis that controls for unobserved 
variables. Although this list of uses may seem abstract, ex 
amples of each type will show that these longitudinal 
analyses often have considerable practical relevance. The ex 
amples are intended to serve as illustrations of the kinds of 
research enabled by longitudinal data, not as an exhaustive 
compilation of the findings of longitudinal research.
Measurement and Analysis of Change
Cross section data can tell what proportion of the labor 
force is unemployed or describe the distribution of wage 
rates of family income at a point in time. In addition, time 
series of aggregated cross section data are useful indicators 
of general trends and cyclical patterns in unemployment, 
wages, income, and so forth. Neither cross section nor time 
series data, however, can tell how many of those 
unemployed in one month find employment in the next 
month or how individuals' wage rates or incomes change 
over time. Only longitudinal data, which track the same in 
dividuals over time, can measure such changes.
An illuminating example is the gross flow data from the 
CPS. These data show not only how many of one month's 
unemployed are employed the next month, but also the
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magnitudes of all the other month-to-month flows among 
employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation in the 
labor force. Furthermore, the underlying data on in 
dividuals' changes in labor force status can be analyzed to 
identify the determinants and correlates of transitions 
among labor force categories. For example, Barren and 
Mellow's analysis [2] of May and June 1976 data on a sample 
of workers unemployed in May revealed that the probability 
of becoming employed by June was higher for males, those 
who devoted more time to job search, and those with 
relatively low reservation wages, and was negatively cor 
related with receipt of unemployment insurance and length 
of time unemployed.
While the CPS data on changes in labor force status il 
lustrate the usefulness of longitudinal information, they also 
illustrate the importance of data accuracy in longitudinal 
analysis. Woltman and Schreiner [18] have reported evidence 
that many of the measured gross changes may reflect 
spurious response changes of persons whose labor force ac 
tivity has not actually changed. According to monthly 
average gross flow data for 1977, 48 percent of the CPS 
unemployed in one month exited from unemployment by the 
next month. In comparison, when the Census Bureau 
reinterviewed subsamples of 1977 CPS respondents with 
regard to the same month, 31 percent of those initially 
measured as unemployed were measured in the reinterviews 
as employed or not in the labor force. The high variability in 
responses for the same period raises the disturbing possibility 
that many, if not most, of the measured month-to-month 
changes in labor force status may be comprised of response 
changes that would occur even in the absence of any real 
changes in status. This is not an indictment of the CPS data 
in particular, but rather a general indication of the sensitivity 
of flow data to measurement error and of the special impor 
tance of data accuracy when addressing the more delicate 
questions often asked of longitudinal data.
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Another example of the use of longitudinal data for 
change measurement is research on earnings mobility. Cross 
section data can reveal what proportion of workers receives 
low earnings at a point in time, but to measure how many of 
these low earners stay low earners and how many leave low- 
earnings status requires longitudinal information. Lillard 
and Willis' study [9] of PSID data examined the persistence 
of low-earnings status among white and black men. They 
defined low earnings in a given year as earnings less than half 
the median earnings of male workers in the CPS. They con 
cluded that, of the low-earning men in a given year, about 45 
percent of the whites and 65 percent of the blacks would still 
have low earnings the next year. McCalPs study [10] of 
CWHS earnings records obtained roughly similar results. 
The similarity of the results from both survey and ad 
ministrative data demonstrates how the validity of one study 
can be assessed by comparison with another.
A recurring question in analyses of change or persistence 
in economic status is whether the observed degree of per 
sistence is due to "population heterogeneity" or "state 
dependence." For example, Plant's study [15] of welfare 
dependence asked the important policy question of whether 
the tendency of welfare families to stay on welfare occurs 
simply because the same factors that cause them to go on 
welfare keep them there or whether, in addition, the ex 
perience of receiving welfare has some sort of addictive ef 
fect that induces continuing welfare dependence. It is usually 
very difficult to distinguish these two types of processes 
because their empirical manifestations are so similar. In 
Plant's study, however, separation of heterogeneity and 
state dependence was facilitated by the availability of infor 
mation on both the experimental and the control families in 
the Seattle-Denver negative income tax experiment. He con 
cluded that the evidence of an addictive state-dependence ef 
fect was weak at best. He also discovered that, if he had used
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arbitrary statistical assumptions commonly employed in 
analyses of nonexperimental data, he would have been mis 
led into estimating a much larger state-dependence effect. 
Despite the difficulty of separating heterogeneity and state 
dependence, researchers have continued to use longitudinal 
data to address this important issue in such areas as labor 
force participation decisions and unemployment. 3
Analysis of Intertemporal Relationships
Longitudinal data are used not only to measure change in 
individuals' status over time, but also to relate individuals' 
experiences or behavior at one time to other experiences or 
behavior at another time. For example, an individual's early 
labor market experience might affect his earning capacity in 
later years, or participation in various government programs 
might affect subsequent economic status. Of course, 
research on such intertemporal relationships requires infor 
mation on the same individuals at different points in time, 
i.e., longitudinal data.
One such use of longitudinal data is Ellwood's study [4] of 
the impact of teenage unemployment on later wages. He 
analyzed NLS data on young men who finished school be 
tween 1965 and 1967 to relate their work experience in their 
first four years out of school to their wage rates in the im 
mediately following years. He concluded, "Early work ex 
perience has a sizable impact on wages. Controlling for in 
dividual effects, experience in the second, third, or fourth 
year out of school tends to be associated with wage increases 
of between 10 and 20 percent a year."
Another example is Ashenfelter's study [1] of the effect of 
federal training programs on the later earnings of program 
enrollees. His sample included 1964 participants in Man-
3. See, for example, Heckman and Willis [6], Heckman and Borjas [5], and Ellwood [4].
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power Development and Training Act programs as well as a 
comparison group of nonparticipants. He compared the two 
groups* CWHS earnings records from 1961 to 1969 to 
estimate the earnings impact of program participation. He 
concluded that training did increase participants' earnings. 
He estimated that men's annual earnings were raised, on 
average, by $150 to $500 in the period immediately following 
training and by about half as much after five years. For 
women, the effect appeared to lie between $300 and $600 and 
did not decline over time.
Analysis Controlling 
for Unobserved Variables
The third use of longitudinal data is in analysis controlling 
for unobserved variables. Often in empirical cross section 
research, the goal is to estimate the effect of a variable X on 
a variable Y, holding other variables constant. Frequently, 
however, some of these other variables either are very dif 
ficult to measure or simply happen not to have been collected 
in the data base. The resulting omission of these unobserved 
variables from the analysis may bias the estimation of X's ef 
fect on Y.
An example is research on the wage effects of union 
membership. Cross section studies have compared the wage 
rates of union members and nonmembers with seemingly 
similar characteristics and have found that union members 
generally receive higher wages. Critics of these studies, 
however, have argued that union members and nonmembers 
may differ in ways not observable to the researcher. It could 
be that the union members, even if they had not been in 
unions, would have earned more than the nonmembers. 
Although the cross section studies typically do control for 
years of schooling, work experience, and other measurable 
factors, the possibility remains that the estimated union- 
nonunion wage differential is due to other unobserved fac 
tors.
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Longitudinal data provide a way of controlling for these 
unobserved factors. If the effects of unobserved 
characteristics of the workers stay roughly constant over 
time, one can estimate union wage effects by examining how 
the same worker's wages change when he changes union 
status. If workers typically experience wage gains when they 
become union members and wage losses when they become 
nonmembers, a positive union impact on wages will be 
estimated. This estimation approach implicitly controls for 
unobserved fixed effects specific to individual workers by 
focusing on wage changes of the same workers over time.
Mellow [11] used this type of approach in his study of 
longitudinally matched CPS data for two samples, one 
followed over 1974-75 and the other over 1977-78. He found 
that union membership is associated with about a 7 percent 
wage premium, smaller than typically found in cross section 
studies, but still significantly greater than zero. Mincer [14] 
conducted a similar study with NLS and PSID data on white 
males and obtained similar results.
The longitudinal union-nonunion wage studies illustrate 
some of the pitfalls of longitudinal analysis, as well as its ad 
vantages. First, the longitudinal approach may not necessari 
ly eliminate omitted-variables problems. Union joiners or 
leavers may differ in systematic ways from individuals whose 
union status does not change. For example, some individuals 
might become nonmembers because they have been pro 
moted to supervisory positions. For these individuals, union 
leaving is correlated with wage gains due to a factor other 
than changed union status. Other individuals may lose union 
membership because they are laid off from union jobs. 
These individuals may undergo wage losses due largely to the 
layoff experience rather than to the change in union status. 
Recognizing that such factors, if omitted, might bias the 
estimated wage effect of union membership, Mincer 
separately analyzed the wage changes of union joiners and
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leavers, those who stayed union members, and those who 
stayed nonmembers among those who had quit their jobs 
and those laid off. His results, it turned out, were not 
dramatically altered. In the PSID data, for instance, relative 
to job stayers who stayed nonmembers, job quitters who 
stayed nonmembers experienced an average wage gain of 9 
percent, and job quitters who stayed members gained 10.6 
percent. In contrast, job quitters who became members gain 
ed 17.2 percent, and job quitters who became nonmembers 
gained only 0.4 percent. These results—showing especially 
large wage gains for union joiners and especially small gains 
for union leavers—remain consistent with the finding of a 
positive union-nonunion wage differential.
A second problem is response error. Even in a cross sec 
tion analysis, misclassification of individuals with respect to 
their union membership status tends to obscure whatever 
wage differences actually exist between union and nonunion 
workers. According to the standard econometric analysis of 
measurement errors in an independent variable in a regres 
sion analysis, the resulting bias in the variable's coefficient is 
proportional to the ratio of the measurement error variance 
to the sum of the measurement error variance and the true 
population variance of the variable. In a longitudinal regres 
sion analysis, where change in a variable is the independent 
variable, the bias from response error may be worse for two 
reasons. First, the measurement error variance may be 
greater because a response error in either of two periods can 
cause an erroneous measure of change. Second, the popula 
tion variance of change in a variable is typically smaller than 
the cross-sectional variance in the level of the variable. 4
In the case of change in union membership status, there is 
indeed reason to suspect considerable measurement error. 
Mincer noted that a disturbingly high proportion of those
4. This point is developed by Taubman [17].
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reporting changes in union membership status also reported 
that they did not change jobs. Suspecting that many of these 
job stayers had not actually changed union status, he 
estimated separate wage effects for job stayers and movers. 
The mover results—such as the ones mentioned above on 
workers that quit or were laid off—showed more distinct 
union wage effects than did the stayer results, which pro 
bably were biased toward zero by response error. Similarly, 
Mellow found virtually no union effect among workers that 
did not change occupation or industry. These results 
highlight the need to give careful attention to response error 
when analyzing longitudinal data, especially if the data were 
obtained in surveys. They also demonstrate the additional 
care in data collection that may be necessary to obtain 
answers to the more subtle research questions posed of 
longitudinal data.
Summary
Recent years have witnessed significant growth in the 
availability of longitudinal data on labor force experience 
and behavior. These data—which follow the same in 
dividuals over time through surveys, administrative records, 
or social experiments—have proven extremely valuable for 
three types of research: measurement and analysis of 
changes in individuals' status over time (e.g., changes in 
employment status or income); analysis of intertemporal 
relationships (e.g., between participation in government 
training programs and later economic success); and analysis 
that must control for unobserved variables (e.g., the analysis 
of union-nonunion wage differences). In some cases, the ex 
istence of longitudinal data has opened up avenues of 
research that simply could not have been pursued otherwise. 
In other cases, longitudinal data have enabled the examina 
tion of previously untestable analytical assumptions and 
consequently have increased the reliability of research find 
ings.
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Despite its great advantages, longitudinal analysis also in 
volves a special problem. Many of the questions addressed 
with longitudinal data are more subtle than those asked of 
cross section data, and their analysis is often sensitive to 
response error. This sensitivity implies first that researchers 
should attempt to minimize response error in their choice of 
data bases. In some cases, for example, data from ad 
ministrative records may be more accurate than survey data. 
In addition, longitudinal analysts should examine their data 
for evidence of response error and explore how response er 
ror might affect their results. The sensitivity of longitudinal 
analysis to response error also raises the question of whether 
longitudinal data collection efforts ought to devote more 
resources to the reduction of such error.
The overwhelming usefulness of longitudinal data for the 
analysis of many issues has been established by a continuing 
succession of valuable studies. Because collection of 
longitudinal data is still a relatively new endeavor, though, 
several issues associated with their collection need explora 
tion. One important question is how to weigh the sample at 
trition problems of continuing an old panel survey against 
the advantages of following the panel over a longer period as 
well as the large fixed costs of initiating a new survey. 
Similar questions pertain to the choice between retrospective 
and repeated interviews. Finally, there exist important and 
unexplored tradeoffs in allocating survey resources between 
interviewing more individuals and improving the accuracy of 
data on those that are interviewed. Some analysis and 
perhaps even purposive experimentation with alternative ap 
proaches to these issues should make the longitudinal data 
developed in the next decade even more valuable than those 
of the past decade.
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(based on selective hearing)
Sar A. Levitan 
The George Washington University
As this conference was proceeding today, a horrible 
thought occurred to me: Can you imagine the setback for 
labor force and productivity statistics if anything were to 
happen to the collection of experts in this room? Now that 
we have completed a very fruitful and stimulating conference 
without mishap, I remain the only obstacle to partaking in 
the happy hour. Let me rush through with my comments, 
hoping that they will not detract from the high level pro 
ceedings of the day.
First, I will summarize what I heard here, even though it 
may be based on my selective hearing.
Second, I will add some observations which I had hoped 
would have been made by others. While our data system 
should be designed to capture the net social impacts of 
domestic policy changes, there is also a feedback effect. 
Federal funding allocations and administrative decisions 
reached by policymakers not only affect society, but they 
also influence the workings of such public agencies as the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau. The con 




Third, we should look at the system as a whole and not 
just individual surveys. Clearly, data collection and publica 
tion are not ends in themselves. The question is whether the 
entire data system helps policymakers formulate and 
evaluate policies. In many cases, I believe there are serious 
gaps which we should span.
Parts of the System
Each of the speakers centered in on one part of the total 
data system. Leon Taub made some thoughtful comments 
about the Current Population Survey (CPS). He indicated 
that the richness of the CPS data are adequate for meeting 
the macroeconomist's basic needs because total employ 
ment, unemployment, and other aggregated data respond in 
a predictable pattern to business conditions. Of course, like 
any other good researcher who makes a living from 
forecasting trends, Leon displayed an understandable ap 
petite for a few more numbers; but speaking as a 
macroeconomist, he gave the CPS a clean bill of health. He 
did, however, have some reservations when he took off his 
macroeconomist hat and put on his microeconomist 
chapeau, which he also wears on occasion. On this level, the 
data are not adequate to solve many labor market-related 
problems. He suggested several directions for developing 
further information, including counting discouraged 
workers in the unemployment totals, producing better data 
for local labor markets, and measuring the impact of 
changes in employment status on household consumption 
patterns.
After Leon's suggestions concerning new data on labor 
market effects, Robert Taggart picked up on this same sub 
ject. He showed how a great deal more knowledge and in 
sight about labor market operations can be milked from the 
CPS for very little extra expenditure. He advocated the link-
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ing of March CPS data on individual and family income and 
earnings with labor force status.
The question Bob Taggart raised goes to the heart of the 
problem: To what extent can we continue to base policies on 
concepts that were developed in the 1930s and which have 
not been updated? Beyond numbers reflecting labor force 
status, we need estimates that link income and earnings with 
a person's household status. Employment or unemployment 
data do not measure economic hardship. Bob showed ways 
in which income, household conditions, and labor force 
status can be combined to produce estimates of real 
economic hardship that persist to plague our society. I hope 
the Census Bureau and the BLS will pay attention to these 
newer concepts.
Another part of our data system is the establishment 
survey which supplies the base ingredients for productivity 
measurements. Elliot Grossman and George Sadler were 
highly critical of the productivity data that BLS derives from 
the establishment survey. There was a time when the arcane 
mysteries of productivity data were mostly of interest to a 
select group of economists and statisticians, but now they 
make headlines. Politicians, media persons and even 
economists on the make are finding these days that a sure 
fire way to gain attention is to come up with some catchy 
plan to boost America's slumping productivity.
Elliot and George have questioned not so much the 
various riverboat gambles the United States has taken to get 
on a noninflationary growth path; rather they have warned 
us that we may not have enough information—or the correct 
data—to navigate the riverboat. We most often have equated 
the overall changes in economic productivity with only labor 
output per work hour. More recent concepts, including total 
factor productivity, consider the relationship between all in 
puts per unit of output. Unlike the older index, this concept
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captures the substitution of capital and energy for labor. 
Last year, total factor productivity growth was even lower 
than labor productivity gains.
However, BLS experts warned us today that total factor 
productivity estimates harbor many problems. For example, 
how should capital be aggregated, and how should capital be 
depreciated so that one has a net capital figure? Despite these 
and other problems, BLS hopes to come out with productivi 
ty estimates that move beyond only labor productivity by 
1983. I hope they do this because I believe that sound 
analysis of America's growth problems will require data on 
more than output-per-work hour data.
Orley Ashenfelter and Gary Solon next discussed the state 
of longitudinal data and how this newer part of the informa 
tion system can enrich our understanding of labor force 
operations. As Orley and Gary already pointed out, I wish 
we had more data on the cost of these longitudinal numbers 
because while they provide better insights, they are also ex 
pensive. I believe we need to know the comparative costs of 
this data source compared with using the same outlays in 
enriching the CPS.
Also, for how long are these longitudinal data good? For 
example, if one starts a cohort of people between 45 and 59 
in 1968, then how long should one continue the survey 
before too many individuals meet their heavenly rewards? 
The case for longitudinal data would be far stronger if we 
knew more about their relative costs and benefits and how 
we could design panels so that we would maximize the infor 
mation returns while we minimize expenditures. These con 
cerns are vital in an era of strict budget cutting of nondefense 
spending.
If I've learned any one message today, it is that we should 
not rely upon any single number. Clearly, we heard that 
message from Ken Prewitt of the Social Science Research
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Council. Ken spoke at lunch and did not have a formal 
paper, but his comments on social indicators are important. 
Social indicator data are derived from longitudinal surveys, 
such as the one published by the University of Michigan 
covering 5,000 families, the Ohio National Longitudinal 
Survey and from public opinion surveys. They illuminate 
many significant developments that may not be captured in 
our traditional labor force numbers. Also, as Ken 
noted—and this backs up the need for longitudinal data—a 
growing number of researchers and media analysts are in 
terested in change over time and not just a single snapshot 
picture. Good labor market analysis should consider the in 
formation obtained from the emerging social indicators.
Media and Policy Needs
While we cannot rely on a single number, we must 
remember that when the network television news people 
report monthly unemployment conditions, they cannot cram 
that many numbers into a 20-second segment. When 
unemployment rises one-tenth of a percentage point to 
almost 10 percent, all we hear is that this is a record 
unemployment rate since the 1930s. Can the networks put 
over the concept that a monthly rise of one-tenth of 1 percent 
is not statistically significant? We need more than one 
number, but reporters, just like economists, face 
resource—in this case time—constraints. The needs of the 
media people must be considered in forming our data 
system.
Beyond the introduction of new concepts, such as 
economic hardship and total factor productivity, is the 
challenge to factor whatever numbers are generated into the 
thinking of policymakers and the general public. We can in 
troduce the best new concepts, but without this education 
process all they will do is remain unused and collect dust.
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Deterioration?
Each of the speakers was assigned to examine one part of 
the total system. While we concentrated on the major labor 
force surveys, it was beyond the scope of the four papers to 
comment on recent developments in the general state of 
labor force data. As part of the budget reductions for non- 
defense spending, the federal government will provide 20 
percent less funding for labor force and other economic data 
in fiscal 1983 than was spent in 1980. This major budget 
reduction does not even include the impact of inflation. A 
statistical system needs ideas but numbers cannot be pro 
duced, analyzed and disseminated without money. The 
system, therefore, faces serious deterioration.
But beyond these funding problems, there is a different 
form of deterioration that may be even more serious in the 
long run. Current federal policy contributes not only to the 
erosion of the existing data system, but also to the stifling of 
vital research and development that could lead to the in 
troduction of new concepts and methods. There is no better 
way to destroy the excellence of the total system.
I call your attention to a report that Secretary Raymond 
Donovan issued, as required by law, when he commented on 
the recent work of the National Commission on Employ 
ment and Unemployment Statistics. Secretary Donovan 
repeated again and again that—and this is a direct quote—he 
"cannot in good conscience" recommend any of the Com 
mission's proposals that cost money. I stopped counting this 
repeated refrain when I ran out of my 10 fingers. Maybe 
somebody here from BLS has counted exactly how many 
times he said that.
Secretary Donovan's comments were quite different from 
the response of the previous Secretary of Labor Ray Mar 
shall. The difference in how they made decisions was a great
Summing Up 133
as the actual difference in results. Six months after the Com 
mission filed its report, former Secretary Marshall said he 
was in favor of counting discouraged workers as 
unemployed. But rather than accept or reject the Commis 
sion recommendations, he indicated that he would await fur 
ther study by BLS before he would factor these findings into 
his final decision. In opposition to this type of reasoned ex 
amination of the Commission's proposals, the present 
Secretary of Labor just completely rejected anything that 
would cost any money. To make sound decisions one should 
examine not only the costs but also the benefits obtained 
from a public investment. While the Reagan administration 
presumably champions cost-benefit estimates, it appears to 
have rejected using any sound cost-benefit analysis in this 
case.
This administration puts a great stress on volunteers, and 
the Commission suggested a triennial survey of volunteers 
because of their impact on GNP, and also because there 
often are very few differences between the work performed 
by volunteers and paid workers. The cost of such a survey 
would be well under $300,000 based on BLS estimates and 
updated for inflation. Public policy calls for more volunteer 
work, and yet we know next to nothing about the volunteer 
workforce. Also, we know very little about the extent to 
which volunteers use their experience to enter the paid labor 
force. Despite the administration's expressed concerns, the 
Secretary of Labor rejected the recommendation for the 
survey.
There are many other examples that are similar to the 
volunteer workforce data proposals. A major tenet of the 
Reagan Administration is reducing the role of the federal 
government by turning over many functions and programs 
to the states and local governments and providing whatever 
aid the federal government gives to states and localities 
through block grants to the states. However, state and local
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labor force data are often quite poor. In fact, in many cases 
the numbers are more guesses than reliable estimates within 
acceptable margins of error. The Commission made many 
suggestions to improve state and local data including a 
boosting of the CPS sample size. This would have yielded 
reasonably reliable state data as well as statistically signifi 
cant data for key groups in the population. Instead of 
boosting the CPS sample, it was cut down to 60,000 under 
recent budget reductions.
There is a serious question concerning the quality of the 
statistics if the sample decreases or is even kept at the same 
level given growing population shifts. For example, data on 
Hispanics and blacks (and in particular black youths) need to 
be improved. If "New Federalism" is to be more than a 
slogan or a subterfuge for cutting federal aid, then state and 
local data need to be improved.
The damage that we are doing to the system cannot easily 
be reversed. It seems that under this administration we are 
going to have to live with deteriorating data which are not as 
responsive to, and reflective of, real conditions. It took 
many years to create this system, and it could lose the trust 
of policymakers and the general public. This would hurt all 
of us, no matter where we stand on other social issues.
I agree with Henry Clay that "statistics are no substitute 
for judgment," but it is irresponsible to design policies that 
are based only on sheer ideology (be it liberal or conser 
vative) and gut feelings. Our labor force and productivity 
data systems could be very strong resources that help put 
America back on course. Yet given recent trends, I fear we 
may be dismantling the compass and letting the sextant grow 
rusty.
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